Schools As Training Grounds for Harassment by McGinley, Ann C.
 
171 
Schools as Training Grounds for Harassment 
Ann C. McGinley† 
INTRODUCTION 
The #MeToo movement, which burgeoned in response to allega-
tions of Harvey Weinstein’s and others’ harassment of women who 
sought careers in Hollywood and elsewhere, has led to increasing con-
cern about sexual harassment in workplaces and other venues.1 Signif-
icant online movements engage in naming and shaming alleged perpe-
trators, and workplaces are rewriting their policies in an attempt to 
prevent and remedy harassment to escape liability for harassers’ con-
duct.2 News reports and op-ed articles focus on the prevalence of sexual 
harassment and harm to women, but, as Professors Vicki Schultz and 
Brian Soucek explain, media reports are limited to a narrow under-
standing of one type of harassment: harassment that is sexual (rather 
than gendered) in nature and suffered predominantly by women at the 
hands of more powerful men.3 By “sexual” harassment, I use the com-
mon term here to refer to unwelcome behavior that is expressed by sex-
ual means: groping, asking for sexual favors, sexual assault, and even 
rape. The motive may be sexual desire, as the #MeToo movement seems 
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 1 Actor Alyssa Milano borrowed the term from an earlier group started by Tarana Burke and 
posted it online. Emma Brockes, #MeToo Founder Tarana Burke: “You Have to Use Your Privilege 
to Serve Other People,” GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/15 
/me-too-founder-tarana-burke-women-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/4NXH-6JAA]. 
 2 Mira Sorvino: Me Too Can’t Just Be Naming and Shaming, USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/11/13/mira-sorvino-me-too-cant-just-naming-an 
d-shaming/1985971002/ [http://perma.cc/E9WJ-TBG2]; Nicole Lyn Pesce, The #MeToo Movement 
Has Changed Policies Across Industries, But There’s Still Work to Be Done, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 
4, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-metoo-movement-has-changed-policies-across-i 
ndustries-but-theres-still-work-to-be-done-2018-10-04 [https://perma.cc/KU9N-X82W]. 
 3 See Vicki Schultz & Brian Soucek, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 227, 227–59 (2019). 
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to emphasize, but it may also be a desire to police gender expectations 
of individuals in the workplace. Where there is an employment relation-
ship and a covered employer, this type of harassment is prohibited by 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,4 if sufficiently severe or pervasive. 
It is also prohibited in schools, whether the harassment be perpetrated 
by other students or teachers, by Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972.5 
A less common but more accurate term that I use throughout this 
paper is “sex- or gender-based harassment.” This term is much broader 
than “sexual harassment” in that it refers to unwelcome behavior that 
occurs because of the sex (biological sex) or gender (social stereotypes 
and expectations that are related to a person of a particular biological 
sex) of the victim that can be but is not necessarily sexual in nature: 
derogatory comments or yelling, physically blocking a person’s way, se-
vere or pervasive treatment because of the victim’s failure to conform 
to gender stereotypes or with an interest in maintaining the gendered 
order of the workplace. These latter versions of harassment can be ei-
ther facially sex- or gender-based or can be neutral in their presentation 
while still occurring because of the sex or gender of the victim. 
As Schultz and Soucek explain, “sexual harassment” that the #Me-
Too movement generally targets may merely be the tip of the iceberg. 
Harassment that is gendered but not necessarily sexual in nature, and 
harassment, whether sexual or gendered, that is perpetrated by groups 
of men (and sometimes women) on both male and female victims have 
been virtually ignored by the movement and the media.6 
Moreover, the link between sex-segregated workplaces, both hori-
zontally and vertically,7 and sex- and gender-based harassment is often 
overlooked.8 In fact, much (if not most) of harassing behavior in work-
places occurs because of gender—the patriarchal structure that pro-
motes the superiority of masculine men over women and gender non-
conforming men.9 
And, while there is considerable discussion about sexual violence 
on college campuses (a form of “sexual harassment”)—how institutions 
 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 
 5 Pub. L. No. 92-318 tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88). 
 6 See Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 135 (2018). 
 7 Philip Cohen, The Problem with Mostly Male (and Mostly Female) Workplaces, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/03/the-problem-with-
mostly-male-and-mostly-female-workplaces/274208/ [http://perma.cc/895U-4RNY]. 
 8 Schultz & Soucek, supra note 3. 
 9 See ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITY AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH A 
DIFFERENT LENS 58–82 (2016) (offering a number of scenarios in which harassment occurs and 
demonstrating that, in most of these scenarios, the motivation is gender—both of the victim and 
of the perpetrators). 
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should respond, what their investigations and hearings should look 
like, and how to protect both the accuser and the accused10—there is 
little or no public discussion of sex- and gender-based harassment that 
occurs in elementary, middle, and high schools.11 The behaviors in-
volved can be sexual, gendered, or neither; the common thread is the 
motive of the harassers—it is based on the sex or gender of the victim 
(as well as the harasser). 
Even though few discuss the problem of sex-or gender-based har-
assment in pre-college schools, the reality is that elementary, middle, 
and high schools serve as training grounds for sex- and gender-based 
harassment later on in life, and the law is not providing an effective 
remedy. Title IX of the Education Act Amendments12 forbids sex- and 
gender-based harassment at all levels from kindergarten through col-
lege, but private causes of action brought under Title IX do little to deter 
school administrators from tolerating serious peer sex- and gender-
based harassment or to compensate victims. This is because the Su-
preme Court has established extremely difficult proof requirements, 
and many lower courts have applied these standards strictly.13 While 
investigations by the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Educa-
tion (“OCR”) have historically done a better job of punishing schools for 
permitting peer sex- and gender-based harassment and requiring im-
proved policies and procedures, the OCR may not have the capacity to 
investigate the vast majority of incidents occurring in schools. Moreo-
ver, given the new regulations proposed by the Department of Educa-
tion under Secretary Betsy DeVos, which adopt the rigid court stand-
ards, there is serious concern that useful OCR investigations may not 
continue.14 
 
 10 ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, 9 THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT BETSY DEVOS’ PROPOSED TITLE IX RULE, 
https://actionnetwork.org/user_files/user_files/000/028/107/original/Two_pager_on_proposed_rule 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/79GA-TLHV]; Victoria Yuen & Osub Ahmed, 4 Ways Secretary DeVos’ Pro-
posed Title IX Rule Will Fail Survivors of Campus Sexual Assault, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRE- 
SS (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2018/ 
11/16/461181/4-ways-secretary-devos-proposed-title-ix-rule-will-fail-survivors-campus-sexual-as-
sault/ [https://perma.cc/SL3T-AX9D]. 
 11 Throughout this article, I use the term sex- and gender-based harassment in its broadest 
sense to mean harassment in workplaces or schools that occurs because of the victim’s sex or gen-
der. There is a debate whether we should merely call this “sexual harassment,” or “sex harass-
ment,” but both seem to be under-inclusive so in the interest of being clear that I am talking about 
illegal harassment that occurs because of sex or gender and may or may not be sexual or gendered 
in nature, I use the more comprehensive term. This behavior, if sufficiently severe or pervasive, 
violates Title VII in the workplace and Title IX in schools. 
 12 Pub. L. No. 92-318 tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88). 
 13 See Part III infra. 
 14 See Part III.B. infra. 
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The fact is that peer15 sex- and gender-based harassment of both 
boys and girls in schools is rampant, and administrators are either un-
able or unwilling to curb it. One problem is adults’ normalization of sex- 
and gender-based harassment by preteens and teens. When girls are 
victims of harassment by boys, school administrators and teachers in-
terpret the behavior as age-appropriate interest in the “opposite sex.” 
When boys are victims of harassment by other boys, administrators and 
teachers call it normal “horseplay.” In both situations, teachers can ex-
acerbate the problem, often blaming the victims for causing trouble by 
reporting the behavior to authorities, and thereby incurring the wrath 
of fellow students.16 Teachers and administrators fail to understand the 
role toxic masculinity plays in harassment, and they often fan the 
flames by encouraging sex stereotyping and gender conformity of both 
boys and girls by both boys and girls. The resulting peer harassment is 
neither normal courting behavior, nor normal roughhousing.17 
This article deals with the schools’ role in permitting and encour-
aging peer sex- and gender-based harassment of children and the law’s 
role in failing to hold schools accountable for their negligent and inten-
tional behavior in sanctioning it. Part I discusses the evidence of ram-
pant sex- and gender-based harassment in schools. Part II analyzes the 
problem through the lens of masculinities theory and explains how cul-
tural notions of masculinity create incentives for boys18 (and some girls) 
to engage in peer sex- and gender-based harassment. 
Part III analyzes court cases and OCR decisions and explains the 
serious disconnect between the two; it demonstrates the proof difficul-
ties that victims experience when filing suit under Title IX and the re-
sulting lack of incentives for schools to correct the problems. It also 
shows that, while the OCR has traditionally held schools to more exact-
ing scrutiny than courts, the new Secretary of Education has proposed 
new regulations that would align its standards with those of the courts. 
Ironically, if the proposed regulations are promulgated, the result in the 
era of #MeToo will be to promote even more sex- and gender-based har-
assment in our schools. 
Part IV proposes new legal standards and interpretations of exist-
ing standards for the courts that would hold schools more accountable 
 
 15 I limit this article to the discussion of illegal harassment by peers of other peers in the 
school context—in other words, student-on-student harassment that occurs because of sex or gen-
der. 
 16 See, e.g., Patterson v. Hudson Area Schools, 551 F.3d. 438, 440 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 17 I have dubbed this reason for sex harassment as the “masculinity motivation.” See McGin-
ley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6. 
 18 I call this the “masculinity mandate.” See Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Mandate: #Me-
Too, Brett Kavanaugh, and Christine Blasey Ford, 23 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POL’Y 
J. __ (forthcoming 2019). 
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for allowing and condoning peer harassment and argues that the courts’ 
standards should be more similar to those applied by those historically 
applied by the OCR. To accomplish prevention, educators must under-
stand the role that toxic masculinity plays in peer sex- and gender-
based harassment while at the same time be aware of the potential un-
equal application of school rules to children of different races and clas-
ses. Finally, this article concludes that the law should create incentives 
for schools to fulfill their responsibility to educate themselves and their 
students to prevent and remedy peer sex- and gender-based harass-
ment. When schools ignore their responsibilities in this area, they be-
come important training grounds for future harassers, a role that the 
#MeToo movement should not tolerate. 
I. EMPIRICAL AND QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE OF PEER SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS 
A.  Empirical and Qualitative Studies on Peer Sexual Harassment 
1. Definitions: legal vs. social science terminology 
Social science data are crucial to the understanding of sex- and gen-
der-based harassment in the schools. But there is one caveat. Social sci-
ence studies can be confusing to lawyers and judges because of the dif-
ferent terms social scientists and lawyers use to describe behaviors. 
Moreover, social scientists and lawyers at times use the same terms but 
define them differently. Social scientists’ definitions consider behaviors 
while the law considers not only behaviors but also motive or intent. For 
example, under Title IX, behavior that is sexual, non-sexual, gendered, 
or non-gendered in nature that is motivated by the victim’s sex or gen-
der and is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive is illegal harass-
ment.19 This legal definition may encompass many different behaviors 
 
 19 See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of 
Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1207–32 (2008) (explaining different scenarios that constitute il-
legal sex- or gender-based harassment). 
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identified by social scientists, including bullying,20 harassment, mob-
bing, sexual harassment, and physical, verbal, and relational aggres-
sion.21 
When scientific surveys ask children whether they have suffered 
from sexual harassment, they do not focus on the legal requirement that 
the behavior be severe or pervasive. They merely ask if the child has 
suffered a particular type of sex- or gender-based behavior over a par-
ticular period of time.22 This means that the survey results can be both 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive by legal standards: over-inclusive 
because the behavior may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to qual-
ify as illegal; under-inclusive because behavior that is not sexual or gen-
dered in nature but whose motive is sex or gender will not be included 
in the results. Thus, legal scholars, lawyers, and the courts must 
acknowledge these weaknesses in translation between social science 
and law when they predict the frequency of sex- and gender-based har-
assment. With this caveat in mind, however, below is a short summary 
of some of the social science quantitative and qualitative evidence of 
sex- and gender-based harassment in the schools as well as a descrip-
tion of facts from court and OCR cases to demonstrate the quality of 
alleged harassment that occurs. 
2.  Social science and other evidence of sex- and gender-based 
harassment 
Recent surveys by the American Association of University Women 
(“AAUW”) concerning sexual harassment in schools reveal that nearly 
half of school children in grades seven through twelve (48%) report hav-
ing been subject to sexual harassment,23 and that 87% of those report-
ing that they suffered harassment also state that they have suffered 
 
 20 Traditionally, psychologists defined bullying, harassment, and mobbing as gender-neutral 
because both victims and perpetrators can be male and female. Given the thin reed supporting the 
conclusion that these behaviors are sex-neutral, feminists questioned this view and other social 
scientists followed. Today, social scientists may disagree about the use of the term “bullying,” but 
many agree that gender is often a cause of or motivation for these bullying behaviors. Moreover, 
while the original psychologists who studied bullying believed it resulted from individual person-
ality traits that disposed perpetrators toward bullying (and perhaps victims toward victimhood), 
social scientists, feminists, and sociologists see bullying as resulting from systemic gender and 
other inequalities. See id. at 1169–80. 
 21 “Physical aggression” is physical but not sexual; “verbal aggression” comprises harmful 
words and statements that are not physical or sexual; “relational aggression” describes behaviors 
employed by children such as excluding others and passing rumors that are harmful to the child’s 
relationship with others. 
 22 See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, QUICK FACTS: SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS (January 2017). 
 23 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, CROSSING THE LINE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
AT SCHOOL 11 (2011) [hereinafter “CROSSING THE LINE”]. This survey asks questions about 
whether the respondent suffered sexual (or gender-based) harassment within the past school year 
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harm as a result.24 While a few students said that it did not bother 
them, many described emotional, physical, and educational responses—
not wanting to go to school, feeling sick to their stomach, having trouble 
sleeping, altering the path they took to school, behavior problems at 
school, and quitting activities at school.25 Half of those stating they were 
harassed to the AAUW said that they had not reported the harassment 
at the time it occurred.26 And, despite this evidence that harassment 
and assault occur on school campuses, schools are drastically underre-
porting the incidences of sexual harassment.27 School information is 
gleaned from data reported by schools receiving federal financial aid 
under Title IX (98,000 schools, nearly half of them with students in sev-
enth through twelfth grades), as part of the Civil Rights Data Collection 
(“CRDC”).28 Of schools with grades seven through twelve, for example, 
79% reported that they had zero reports of sexual harassment or bully-
ing based on sex during the 2015–16 school year; 99% reported that they 
had zero reports of rape during the same time frame; and 94% reported 
that they had zero reports of sexual assault other than rape in school 
during the same time period.29 
In some schools, sexual harassment is the norm.30 Studies demon-
strate, moreover, that much sexual harassment (physical and verbal) 
occurs in the open, with teachers looking on but doing nothing.31 When 
teachers are not trained about what is sexual harassment and how to 
 
but does not require severity or pervasiveness for the respondent to answer in the affirmative. 
Neither does it require that the perpetrators be motivated by gender or sex. Nor does it include 
sex- and gender-based harassment that is not sexual or gendered in nature but that is motivated 
by sex or gender. Thus, this survey is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive when it comes to the 
legal definition under Title IX. See notes 19–22 supra & accompanying text. 
 24 KEVIN MILLER, SCHOOLS ARE STILL UNDERREPORTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT 
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.aauw.org/article/schools-still-underreporting-sexual-harassment-and-
assault/ [http://perma.cc/NU93-M5XZ] [hereinafter “SCHOOLS ARE STILL UNDERREPORTING”]. 
 25 CROSSING THE LINE, supra note 23, at 22. Cases document other serious harms resulting 
from sex- and gender-based harassment in schools. See infra note 94. T.Z. v. City of New York, 634 
F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reporting harms such as inability to go to school, self-cutting, 
PTSD, attempted suicide, and, ultimately, in the most severe cases, suicide). 
 26 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, QUICK FACTS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS (January 2017) [hereinafter “QUICK FACTS”]. 
 27 Id; MILLER, supra note 24. 
 28 QUICK FACTS, supra note 26. 
 29 MILLER, supra note 24. 
 30 See J. Forber Pratt et al., A Qualitative Investigation of Gang Presence and Sexual Harass-
ment in a Middle School, 27 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 1929, 1935–36 (2018) (concluding that while 
most of the sexual harassment seemed to be initiated by gang members, it was not all related to 
gang membership; sexual harassment was the norm, and a failure of adults to respond to open 
sexual harassment reinforced it as normal). 
 31 Id. The cases confirm this finding. See, e.g., S.K. v. North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 168 F. Supp. 
3d 786, 796–99 (W.D. Pa. 2016). 
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respond to it, they may validate the behaviors that constitute sexual 
harassment as normal.32 
Studies demonstrate that although girls and women tend to suffer 
more adverse effects than boys and men from harassment, boys and 
men do experience emotional damage, especially when sexual harass-
ment is used as a method of performing hegemonic masculinity, harass-
ing someone for the purpose of reinforcing the masculinity of the har-
assers, ridiculing the gender performance (either too masculine or too 
feminine of male and female victims), or drawing acceptable boundaries 
of how victims should perform their gender.33 Especially LGBTQ+ stu-
dents have “poorer mental and physical health, less engagement with 
school, and higher suicide rates than their heterosexual peers.”34 
Straight boys and men also suffer from homophobic slurs, which cause 
increased anxiety and depression as well as alienation among middle 
school children, especially boys.35 One study found that there existed 
ample evidence of verbal harassment of LGBTQ+ students by both stu-
dents and educators.36 Approximately 90% of study participants had 
heard a student verbally harass another because of bias against 
LGBTQ+ individuals, whereas 44% had heard school staff engaging in 
the same verbal harassment.37 
Much harassment occurs in the open with victims and perpetrators 
who are both boys and girls and with victims of different races. Studies 
in middle schools confirm, however, that the perpetrators of sex- and 
gender-based harassment against both girls and boys are most fre-
quently boys.38 One study found that the highest rate of physical sexual 
assault was of African-American girls, followed by African-American 
boys.39 And students reporting sexual harassment stated that it oc-
curred most frequently in hallways, followed by classrooms.40 
 
 32 Forber-Pratt, supra note 30, at 1936 (citing L. Charmaraman et al., Is It Bullying or Is It 
Sexual Harassment? Knowledge, Attitudes and Professional Development Experiences of Middle 
School Staff, 83 J. SCH. HEALTH 438 (2013)). 
 33 See James Gruber & Susan Fineran, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, and School Outcomes 
for High School Girls and Boys, 22 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 112, 117 (2016). 
 34 Id.; see also Tyler Hatchel et al., Sexual Harassment Victimization, School Belonging, and 
Depressive Symptoms among LGBTQ Adolescents: Temporal Insights, 88 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 
422 (2018) (finding that middle and high school LGBTQ+ victims of sexual harassment suffer in-
creased depressive symptoms over a period of time). 
 35 Gruber & Fineran, supra note 33, at 117. 
 36 Eliza Dragowski et al., Educators’ Reports on Incidence of Harassment and Advocacy To-
ward LGBTQ Students, 53 PSYCH. IN THE SCH. 127 (2016). 
 37 Id. at 137. 
 38 See Dorothy L. Espelage et al., Understanding Types, Locations, & Perpetrators of Peer-Peer 
Harassment in U.S. Middle Schools: A Focus on Sex, Racial, and Grade Differences, 71 CHILDREN 
& YOUTH SERV. REV. 174, 180 (2016). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 181. 
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Although social scientists traditionally have seen bullying and sex-
ual harassment as two separate phenomena and have thought of bully-
ing as gender-neutral, recently, social scientists have begun to question 
the bullying paradigm that is both gender-neutral and based on indi-
vidual personalities rather than systemic causes.41 One problem with 
the bullying literature is that it defines bullying as neutral and not gen-
der-based and thereby underestimates important injuries caused by 
gender-based harassment.42 This is particularly important when it 
comes to the law for two reasons: 1) anti-bullying efforts often ignore 
gender-based harms, many of which are intentional, and 2) Title IX for-
bids sex- or gender-based discrimination and not bullying that does not 
occur because of sex or gender of the victim. Schools do two contradic-
tory things that allow them to escape responsibility: they engage in 
anti-bullying campaigns and, at other times, hide behind bullying 
(which does not occur because of sex and is not illegal) in order to defend 
Title IX claims. Some newer social science research demonstrates that 
girls suffer from gender-based harms caused by sex-based peer aggres-
sion, and this research argues that bullying scholars should recognize 
the gendered nature of much bullying.43 In fact, at least one study finds 
that gender-based sexual harassment that employs stereotypes, both 
sexist and anti-heterosexist, causes greater harm to victims’ school out-
comes than gender-neutral bullying does.44 Those harms include ero-
sion of victims’ school engagement, alienation of victims from teachers, 
and decreased academic achievement of victims.45 It is important to un-
derstand that much of what some social scientists may label “bullying” 
by looking at the behaviors alone is actually illegal harassment under 
federal civil rights laws that occurs because of the victim’s sex or gender 
nonconformity. Thus, although it is not possible to conclude that all bul-
lying behavior has a sex- or gender-based motive, especially in the 
school context much of it does. Therefore, these behaviors can constitute 
both bullying in the traditional social science definition and sex- or gen-
der-based harassment in the legal context.46 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 For an explanation of the bullying research and whether it is gender-neutral or gender-
based, see McGinley, supra note 19, at 1191–92 (explaining that many of the behaviors categorized 
by social scientists as bullying also occur because of the victim’s sex, which would make them 
illegal under Title VII). 
 43 See generally Rosalyn Shute et al., High School Girls’ Experience of Victimization by Boys: 
Where Sexual Harassment Meets Aggression, 25 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 269 
(2016); McGinley, supra note 19, at 1174–82 (arguing that bullying often does have a gendered 
aspect to it and collecting feminist literature that agrees with this proposition). 
 44 James Gruber & Susan Fineran, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, and School Outcomes for 
High School Girls and Boys, 22 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 112 (2016). 
 45 Id. at 112–13. 
 46 See generally McGinley, supra note 19. 
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Even social scientists are beginning to understand that their origi-
nal conclusion that bullying is not related to gender is likely erroneous. 
Studies demonstrate that for boys and girls there is a positive correla-
tion between being perpetrators of bullying behaviors in middle school, 
such as homophobic name-calling, and engaging in sexual violence later 
on.47 A recent study found that both boys and girls who reported that 
they engaged in bullying and homophobic name-calling during middle 
school were more likely to be perpetrators of sexual violence in high 
school.48 But the correlation between students who are victims of bully-
ing in middle school and their tendency to commit sexual violence in 
high schools is gender dependent. Boys who are victims of homophobic 
name-calling react by engaging in more sexual violence against others, 
whereas girls who are victims of homophobic name-calling in middle 
school are not more likely to perpetrate sexual violence in high school.49 
Given that homophobic name-calling in middle schools (which 
seems to be largely ignored by teachers) seems to increase the perpetra-
tion of sexual violence in high school, the authors of the study recom-
mended interventions and education of children that would occur before 
middle school, in the later elementary school years, that would prevent 
homophobic name-calling.50 Prevention of homophobic name-calling 
seems to be important not only to reduce the stress of children but also 
to reduce increased sexual violence in high school. The authors pointed 
to social emotional learning (“SEL”), a system that enhances communi-
cation and empathy of middle school children that has proven success-
ful in reducing homophobic name-calling and sexual violence.51 
 
 47 See generally Dorothy L. Espelage, et. al, Longitudinal Examination of the Bullying-Sexual 
Violence Pathway across Early to Late Adolescence: Implicating Homophobic Name-Calling, 47 J. 
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 1880 (2018). 
 48 Id. at 1880–81, 1888. According to the authors of the study, bullying is engaging in recur-
rent aggressive acts that are physical, verbal, or relational; homophobic name-calling is gender-
based harassment using derogatory terms that indicate that the object is a member of a sexual 
minority, but it is often directed at members of sexual majorities as well; sexual violence comprises 
nonconsensual physical sexual acts as well as verbal harassment. The authors include both sexual 
harassment in the legal sense and physical and verbal harassment in the definition of sexual vio-
lence. Of course, under Title IX, homophobic name calling itself could be a form of gender-based 
harassment if it is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and denies the victim equal access 
to educational opportunities. 
 49 Id. at 1889–90. 
 50 Id. at 1889. 
 51 Id. at 1890. 
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B.  Case Studies of Sex-Based Harassment 
Fact patterns alleged in cases and OCR complaints under Title IX 
provide a qualitative view of the type of sex- and gender-based harass-
ment that occurs in schools.52 Court cases reveal allegations of egre-
gious harassment against girls and boys perpetrated by individuals and 
groups of boys and girls. School officials react by neglecting the behavior 
and even by hostile actions toward the victim. One case that demon-
strates the destructive behavior and the school’s failure to protect the 
victims is Wells v. Hense53 where the plaintiffs alleged54 that two tenth-
grade boys sexually assaulted two tenth-grade girls in a math classroom 
with the shades drawn and the doors locked while other students looked 
on.55 Afterwards, other students gossiped and harassed the victims ver-
bally. The plaintiffs alleged that the school assured them that they 
would investigate and take prompt remedial action but that the school 
did not do either. As a result, the girls were forced to leave school and 
finish out the school year by studying at home.56 
Severe sex- and gender-based harassment occurred in Thomas v. 
Town of Chelmsford57 where a ninth-grade boy was harassed repeatedly 
and ultimately raped with a broomstick by fellow players at football 
camp.58 The next day, the coach told the victim, Matthew, “This is part 
of growing up.”59 As a result of the school district’s failure to take the 
victim’s report seriously, male athletes began to bully and harass Mat-
thew, calling him “Broomstick,” making derogatory sexual comments 
about him in school and social media postings, and threatening violence 
against him.60 Teachers singled Matthew out in front of other children 
in class, ridiculing him, and accusing him of being an “instigator.”61 One 
teacher failed to discipline a student who hit Matthew with a shoe in 
class; another did not comply with Matthew’s Individual Education 
 
 52 Depending on the procedural posture of the cases described in this subsection, the facts in 
court cases are as alleged or taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; the facts in OCR 
investigation reports have been found by a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding of a 
school’s liability. 
 53 235 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 54 Id. at 6 (the allegations in this case are taken as true because the court is deciding the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). 
 55 Id. at 5. 
 56 Id. at 8–9. The court properly refused to grant the motion to dismiss because the complaint 
plausibly alleged deliberate indifference when it alleged that the school did not do an adequate 
investigation or punish the boys who were allegedly responsible for the sexual assaults, thus mak-
ing it impossible for the victims to continue in the school. 
 57 267 F. Supp. 3d 279 (D. Mass. 2017). 
 58 Id. at 290. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 290–91. 
 61 Id. at 292–93. 
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Plan (“IEP”);62 another told the class, “[C]hildren who report something 
are snitches and are the worst type of person.”63 The athletic director 
swore at Matthew and told Matthew’s parents that the school had found 
no wrongdoing by the alleged rapists.64 The harassment escalated for 
months, lasting for the entire school year, with mocking and ridicule at 
lacrosse tryouts, sexually explicit threats by one of the alleged rapists 
toward Matthew, and a dean’s instruction to Matthew to “man up,” be-
cause the behavior was “boys just being boys.”65 The captain of the la-
crosse team yanked Matthew’s facemask and yelled in his face that he 
“was going to f . . . ing kill” Matthew if he did not quit the team.66 Graf-
fiti appeared on the bathroom walls that stated, “Matt Thomas likes it 
in the ass.”67 Ultimately, Matthew and his family reported twenty-four 
incidents to the school during the school year.68 
A female student entering the ninth grade alleged egregious har-
assment in S.K. v. North Allegheny School District.69 Even before the 
school year began, the plaintiff received a text message from a tenth-
grade girl stating, “You f . . . ing bitch, I’m going to cut your f . . . ing 
face.”70 After the plaintiff told her sister, the plaintiff received another 
text message from a second girl stating, “You just dug your grave 
deeper.”71 Many harassing posts on the plaintiff’s Facebook page fol-
lowed. This was just the beginning. 
Continuous harassment included texts and oral threats from girls 
such as “I am going to slit your (and your friend’s) throats, that’s a 
promise, not a threat;”72 daily verbal insults in the school halls that the 
plaintiff was a “slut” and a “c . . . t;” the altering of a photograph to show 
the plaintiff with a banana in her mouth;73 football players throwing 
bananas at her and proclaiming loudly that the plaintiff had herpes; 
pushing, shoving, and touching by male students; football players pin-
ning the plaintiff against the lockers and groping her sexually; and es-
calating abuse during lunch period so that the plaintiff ultimately had 
 
 62 Id. at 293 (the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires schools to create IEPs 
for students with disabilities who are covered by the Act. Pub. L. 101-476; 20 U.S.C. 1414). 
 63 Id. at 294. 
 64 Id. at 293–94. 
 65 Id. at 294. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 295. 
 68 Id. 
 69 168 F. Supp. 3d 786, 796 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (describing egregious harassment of a ninth-grade 
girl by boys and girls at her school). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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to eat lunch alone in a classroom. Things got so bad that the harassment 
spilled into the plaintiff’s employment, and her employer became 
alarmed and warned the principal.74 
The plaintiff repeatedly reported these events to the principal. Her 
parents filed a police report against a female student who had threat-
ened her.75 In response, the student escalated the harassment, physi-
cally assaulting the plaintiff on many occasions. Despite the relentless 
harassment that the plaintiff reported, much of which was witnessed 
by faculty members, male athletes who were perpetrators were never 
punished. Female harassers and other male harassers were merely 
talked to, but school authorities did nothing even remotely effective to 
stop the harassment.76 In fact, the plaintiff tried to commit suicide after 
more than six months of continuous harassment, but even that act led 
to increased harassment.77 The school officials literally gave up; they 
told the plaintiff that they could not stop the harassment and encour-
aged her to attend another school. Ultimately, the plaintiff transferred 
for the rest of the school year, but she returned to the school the follow-
ing year, and the harassment continued so that the plaintiff was forced 
to leave a second time.78 
In Haines v. Metropolitan Government of Davidson County,79 an 
eleven-year-old girl was subjected to more than twenty sexual assaults 
at school by two eleven-year-old boys.80 The complaint alleged that the 
boys threw the girl, Jessica, to the ground, laid on top of her in a sexual 
manner, fondled her buttocks, breasts, and genitals, and verbally as-
saulted her. They told her that they were going to have sex with her, 
and they asked her if she was a virgin and if she had been raped be-
fore.81 When Jessica tried to send a note to her teacher to tell her of the 
abuse, her teacher tore up the note and told Jessica not to be a “tattle 
tale.”82 Jessica also told the principal, and school authorities did virtu-
ally nothing to stop the harassment. The boys finally admitted to the 
harassment, and they were given only one-day in-school suspensions.83 
 
 74 Id. at 797. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 799. 
 78 Id. at 798. Fortunately, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Title IX 
claim, which was supposedly based on an argument that there were insufficient allegations of facts 
constituting deliberate indifference. It is difficult to imagine that a court would ever dismiss a case 
with these facts. 
 79 Haines v. Metro. Govern. Of Davidson Cty., 32 F. Supp. 2d 991 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
 80 Id. at 995. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 996. 
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The assaults continued even though Jessica’s psychiatrist warned the 
principal about the serious effect of the assaults.84 
Besides the cases decided by the courts, OCR case resolutions also 
document severe harassment that occurs in schools. One OCR case res-
olution85 revealed that the complaining student had received a series of 
private electronic messages attempting to extort nude photos of her, 
and the school told her to report it to the police but took no further ac-
tion.86 
In the West Contra Costal Unified School District, a spate of har-
assing and criminal behaviors was documented by the OCR. The reso-
lution described severe sexually harassing behavior that permeated the 
education environments at school sites.87 The OCR found that a female 
student was raped in a high school classroom by two male students in 
2008.88 A year later, several men raped another female high school stu-
dent on school property; some of the perpetrators were current or for-
mer students in the district. A male girls’ basketball coach in the dis-
trict was accused the same year of watching female students change 
clothes and inappropriate touching and sexual comments in the locker 
room in the presence of the entire team.89 The OCR described frequent 
nonconsensual sexual touching among students between classes and 
during lunch periods. The behavior included groping, grabbing, forced 
kisses and hugs, and “grinding.”90 A health center employee admitted 
to counseling female students in the West Contra Coastal District every 
year because they complained about forced oral sex, being grabbed and 
held against their will, and being groped. While most of this behavior 
was initiated by male students on female students, sometimes female 
students initiated the behavior on male students or the behavior oc-
curred between students of the same sex. Female students sometimes 
submitted to unwanted touching because they feared that if they re-
sisted, the behavior would escalate.91 Students often called each other 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 The OCR provides access through its website to case resolution letters and agreements that 
were reached after October 1, 2013. These OCR case resolutions are particularly helpful in fur-
thering our understanding of how the OCR interprets the law and applies it to facts on the ground. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.ed.gov/ocr-search-resolutions-letters-and-agreements (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2019) [https://perma.cc/379J-LDBZ]. 
 86 See Perris Union High Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 09-15-1263, 10 (Apr. 21, 
2016). 
 87 West Contra Costal Unified Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 09-10-5002, 7 (Nov. 
6, 2013) (this description gives only some of the facts concerning harassment in this district be-
cause harassment was so pervasive). 
 88 Id. at 6. 
 89 Id. at 7. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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sexually derogatory names, and slang about female anatomy was fre-
quent. Rumors circulated concerning female students’ sexual reputa-
tions. 
Similar behaviors occurred in the middle and elementary schools 
in the same school district, including a female middle school student 
who was sexually assaulted by another girl in the restroom.92 There was 
pervasive graffiti throughout the district; male students who appeared 
feminine were labeled “faggot[s].”93 These student victims were, accord-
ing to a middle school principal, not necessarily gay but were perceived 
as such because they did not participate in sports or had mostly female 
friends.94 
Many of these behaviors that took place in the West Contra Coastal 
Unified School District were criminal in nature, and criminal authori-
ties should have investigated and prosecuted where necessary. But be-
cause criminal sanctions take place after the fact, it is crucial for school 
authorities who are often present and aware of much of the behavior to 
control the behavior before it reaches the criminal level. School admin-
istrators and teachers need to be taught how to recognize and deal with 
these situations so they can prevent physical, emotional, and educa-
tional harm to students. Only risk of significant liability or OCR penal-
ties will be sufficient to create the proper incentives to train educators 
to take action before the behavior gets out of control. 
*** 
The empirical and qualitative studies and the cases alleging Title 
IX violations demonstrate that sex- and gender-based harassment is 
common and that it has severe effects. Children’s responses to peer har-
assment, as is obvious from the cases, include crying, inability to go to 
school, self-cutting, PTSD, attempted suicide, and ultimately, in the 
most severe cases, suicide.95 
Cases and OCR complaints and investigation victims seem to be 
disproportionately children with disabilities, even if there is no allega-
tion of disability-based discrimination. This finding is consistent with 
the studies that demonstrate that children with disabilities are more 
vulnerable to harassment than children who do not have disabilities.96 
 
 92 Id. at 10. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See, e.g., T.Z. v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (cutting, diffi-
culty sleeping, PTSD). 
 96 See Jesse Krohn, Sexual Harassment, Sexual Assault, and Students with Special Needs: 
Crafting an Effective Response for Schools, 17 U. PENN. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 29, 31–33 (2014). 
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Moreover, many complainants in the OCR process allege race or na-
tional origin (as well as disability) and sex- or gender-based harass-
ment. Studies show that girls of color are more often victims of sex- or 
gender-based harassment.97 A number of cases also arise in the setting 
of very young children. Children as young as five years old are telling 
their parents about sexual harassment and their parents are filing com-
plaints.98 
One specific concern that arises in the complaints is the possibility 
of racial motives for the complaints. While most of the cases do not dis-
cuss race unless the complainant files a race-based claim, race is often 
erased from the picture. A proper response to the problem of sex- and 
gender-based harassment in school should avoid creating additional 
problems by listening to victims or disciplining perpetrators unequally 
depending on their racial identities. All schools and OCR officials must 
be aware: differential treatment of children based not only on their gen-
der but also on their race must be avoided.99 
II. MASCULINITIES, MEAN GIRLS, AND PEER SEX HARASSMENT 
As noted above, most peer sex- and gender-based harassment in 
schools is perpetrated by boys (often in groups), some of it on boys and 
some of it on girls. Peer sex- and gender-based harassment stems from 
a desire for status by performing masculinity in prescribed ways, and it 
often not only solidifies the perpetrator’s place in the group, but also 
adds to the group’s status. This article explains that masculinity is a 
powerful motivation for sex- and gender-based harassment. While mas-
culinities theory may not completely explain all different types of har-
assment and bullying that occur in school, many cases, when examined 
through the lens of masculinities theory, reveal that societal notions of 
masculinity underlie a very large percentage of the harassment that 
occurs. 
Masculinities theory explains that masculinity is not a biological 
imperative, but instead is a performance that is socially constructed. 
 
 97 See Espelage et al., Understanding, supra note 38. 
 98 See Amy B. Cyphert, Objectively Offensive: The Problem of Applying Title IX to Very Young 
Children, 51 FAM. L. QUART. 325 (2017) (discussing cases of very small children accused of sexual 
harassment); Hunter v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 456 F. Supp. 2d 255 (D. Mass. 2006) (alleging 
that kindergartner was coerced by a third-grade male student into lifting up her dress, pulling 
down her underwear, and spreading her legs every time she wore a dress on the school bus). 
 99 At the time I was writing this, a woman who was a high school and middle school principal 
informed me that in the middle school in which she worked, a school of lower income families, 
parents of white girls would frequently complain that black boys were harassing the girls. The 
difficulties associated with these types of reports, given the historical context in the U.S. are obvi-
ous, and OCR workers and educators must be trained to handle these types of cases with sensitiv-
ity. 
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Boys are encouraged to perform a particular type of masculinity. Mas-
culinity is defined by what one is not, not by what one is. That is, mas-
culine boys must constantly prove that they are not girls (or effeminate) 
and not gay.100 Boys should be tough, not weak. A showing of emotion—
especially crying or tenderness—makes a boy weak. Boys are particu-
larly vulnerable to these messages and bullying from a failure to comply 
with the masculinity code in their pre-teen years. As a result, as they 
approach puberty, it is not uncommon for boys to engage in masculinity-
enhancing performances, including sex- and gender-based harassment 
and violence against boys and girls in order to prove their masculinity 
to themselves and to the boys surrounding them.101 
Depending on the individual’s intersectional identities, there are 
numerous ways to perform masculinity.102 Boys of different social clas-
ses and races tend to perform masculinity in different ways. Among 
adults, the most powerful masculinity is that of the hegemonic mascu-
linity—the type of masculinity associated with upper-middle class 
white men who are wealthy professionals. But, even in the adult world, 
different groups in society approve of different types of performances, 
 
 100 See NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 36 (2010). 
There is a strong current among progressive young adults that resists the binary classification of 
sex as male and female. I recognize and applaud this movement and understand that not all per-
sons fit into the binary that society has established. Clearly, persons are born intersex as well as 
male and female; moreover, trans and other non-cisgender persons may live on a gender spectrum 
and perform their genders in different ways depending on their preferences or needs. See, e.g., 
Amanda Montañez, Visualizing Sex as a Spectrum, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 29, 2017), https:// 
blogs.scientificamerican.com/sa-visual/visualizing-sex-as-a-spectrum/ [http://perma.cc/46LQ-57Q 
P]; Ritch C. Savin-Williams, What Everyone Should Know About Genderqueer and Nonbinary, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (July 29, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/sex-sexuality-and-
romance/201807/what-everyone-should-know-about-genderqueer-and-non-binary [https://perma.c 
c/3YT6-KTUY]. The gender regime that I describe—an imposition of masculinity on boys – is par-
ticularly harmful to those individuals who do not wish to, or who cannot, alter their bodies or 
genders to perform as society expects. It is difficult to explain gender theory given that much of 
it—at least the language used—relies in large part on the binary that has previously been ac-
cepted, but I hope to avoid essentialism in my analysis. The binary itself is essentialist, and to 
some extent, so is much of masculinities theory. But this theory is receptive to all persons, whether 
cisgender or not, and should be supportive if we can find a language that works to describe the 
reality that is society’s pressure on persons who are perceived to be men and boys to perform mas-
culinity in particular ways given their particular identities (racial, age-based, sexual orientation, 
etc.) in certain contexts. I will leave for another day the effort to create a language that is more 
inclusive should this essay fail to be so. 
 101 See McGinley, supra note 6; Beth A. Quinn, Sexual Harassment and Masculinity: The Power 
and Meaning of “Girl Watching,” 16 GENDER & SOC’Y 386 (2002). 
 102 See MCGINLEY, supra note 9. 
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and individuals tend to perform the masculine identities that are fa-
vored by the groups to which they belong.103 These performances, too, 
often take a toll on the individual.104 
While different socio-economic groups express preferred masculin-
ity in different ways,105 common among all socio-economic groups is the 
use of sex- and gender-based harassment of women and men (girls and 
boys) as a means of proving their masculinity to themselves and oth-
ers.106 The victims are male and female, straight, gay, and trans. Work-
places are key locations for proving masculinity because men’s sense of 
identity often derives from the work they do.107 But these behaviors ap-
pear much sooner in boys’ lives. Gender norms are ubiquitous in our 
culture, and young children are aware of gendered expectations long 
before they attend school. Once in school, boys from all social and racial 
backgrounds feel pressure to prove their masculinity. Boys are admon-
ished not to be a “girl,” in other words, not to be weak.108 In schools, sex- 
and gender-based harassment is rampant, both at the college and uni-
versity levels and from kindergarten through high school.109 
In schools, boys are encouraged to demonstrate their masculinity 
and to hide their feminine characteristics. One way of doing this at the 
middle and high school levels is through sex- and gender-based harass-
ment.110 Groups of boys join to harass both girls and other boys. The 
goal of harassing boys and girls is to elevate the masculinity of the har-
assers and to set group gender rules. Harassing both boys and girls es-
tablishes the superiority of masculinity over femininity.111 Boys who do 
not conform their gender performances to accepted forms of masculinity 
 
 103 See Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L. REV. 221, 242–
47, 256–59 (2015) (examining the different forms of masculinity performed by male police officers 
and young black men living in neighborhoods targeted by the police). 
 104 See DOWD, supra note 100, at 58–60. 
 105 See MCGINLEY, supra note 9, at 24–25; McGinley, Policing, supra note 103 (explaining that 
men are responsible for more than 90% of violence internationally, compared to their female coun-
terparts who commit only about 10% of violent acts; that engaging in crime is a masculine perfor-
mance; that a large percentage of young men of all classes commit crimes, but the types of crimes 
men commit vary depending on their class status, and middle and upper class young men tend to 
“age out” of crime sooner because of the availability of paid work). 
 106 See McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6. 
 107 MCGINLEY, supra note 9, at 29–32. 
 108 See PLAN INTERNATIONAL, THE STATE OF GENDER EQUALITY FOR U.S. ADOLESCENTS 4–5 
(2018) (finding in a 2018 survey of 1,000 children ages 10–19 that 82% of boys surveyed had heard 
someone tell a boy that he was acting like a girl, which they interpret to mean that the boy is 
“emotional, crying, sensitive, weak, feminine, and moody/dramatic—and implicitly unbecoming.”). 
 109 See supra Part I, at 4–7. RAINN, CAMPUS SEXUAL VIOLENCE: STATISTICS (2019), 
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/BV9J-9DUK]. 
 110 See generally, McGinley, supra note 6. 
 111 Id. at 104. 
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are frequently the victims of this harassment. Moreover, boys, espe-
cially in segregated spaces such as sports teams, tend to harass other 
boys who are new to the program in order to assure understanding of 
and compliance with the rules of masculinity.112 In schools, some of the 
cases reveal, coaches either join in or look the other way when this boy-
on-boy harassment is occurring.113 
When girls join groups of boys to harass boys, they may do so in 
large part in order to “fit in” with the most powerful group of boys who 
perform their masculinity in a socially acceptable manner.114 At the 
middle school level this type of harassment increases substantially,115 
at a time when children are encountering their own gender and sexual 
identities. The harassment serves to establish and preserve the soci-
ety’s gender hierarchy. Girls, as well as boys, police the gender perfor-
mances of boys by, for example, homophobic name-calling.116 This be-
havior is directed not only at boys who are gay but also at boys who 
identify as straight.117 Thus, although the language used often refers to 
the supposed sexual orientations of the victims, the behavior is used not 
only to punish outsiders because of their sexual orientations but also 
because their gender identities do not conform to the expected roles. 
One purpose of the harassment is to assure the power of the binary gen-
der roles that the boys and girls play. The harassment not only confirms 
the power of the masculine boys and feminine girls but also denigrates 
the victims for their failure to perform their masculinity in socially ac-
ceptable ways.118 
We often hear of “mean girls,”119 popular girls who engage in com-
petitive mistreatment of other girls, especially during middle and high 
 
 112 Id. at 106. 
 113 See Perris Union High Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 09-15-1263, 10 (Apr. 21, 
2016). 
 114 There is some emerging research that shows that at least some girls use forms of relational 
aggressive behavior as well as physical and verbal aggression toward boys as well. See, e.g., Si-
obhan Dytham, The Role of Popular Girls in Bullying and Intimidating Boys and Other Popular 
Girls in Secondary School, 44 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 212 (2018) (describing aggression of popular girls 
toward other girls and boys in a white working-class school in England). 
 115 See, e.g., S.K. North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 168 F. Supp. 3d 786 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (sexually, 
physically and verbally harassing behaviors against a ninth-grade girl). 
 116 See Espelage, supra note 47, at 1880–81. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See, McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6. 
 119 “Mean Girls” was a movie starring Lindsey Lohan produced by Paramount Pictures in 2004. 
The plot focuses on a clique of popular high school girls, known as “the Plastics” who mistreat 
other girls in the school. See MEAN GIRLS (Paramount Pictures 2004). “Mean Girls” is also cur-
rently a Broadway musical. Both the movie and the play were inspired by Queen Bees and Wan-
nabes by Rosalind Wiseman. See ROSALINE WISEMAN, QUEEN BEES AND WANNABES: HELPING 
YOUR DAUGHTER SURVIVE CLIQUES, GOSSIP, BOYS, AND THE NEW REALITIES OF GIRL WORLD (2002). 
See Esther Zuckerman, Revisiting ‘Mean Girls’ with Rosalind Wiseman (Apr. 28, 2014), https://ww 
w.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/04/revisiting-mean-girls-with-rosalind-wiseman/3 
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school years.120 Many of these behaviors, too, are likely attributable to 
maintaining gender hierarchies in schools. The “mean girls” are aligned 
with the popular boys who perform the most powerful form of mascu-
linity, and, generally, the girls’ power comes from their relationship 
with these boys. Girls may use harassment of other girls to maintain 
their competitive edge with the most powerful boys—the masculine 
boys—and to assure that the hierarchy of the masculine over the femi-
nine continues to thrive.121 The relationships between gender dynamics 
and bullying and harassment in schools are very complicated, but there 
is no question that gender is involved. 
Gendered behaviors are difficult to recognize because gender is of-
ten invisible. That is, because gender is embedded in our society, we 
interpret learned gender behaviors as biological imperatives, and we 
see the behavior as normal. But much learned behavior that is destruc-
tive of children, both boys and girls, does not result from biology but 
from societal pressures to conform to certain gender norms. The cases 
discussed below give a glimpse into the types of behaviors that children 
are perpetrating on other children and the failure of adults to recognize 
the seriousness of the behaviors and to respond to them appropriately. 
The cases demonstrate that some teachers and administrators stand by 
as sex- and gender-based harassment occurs between peers without dis-
ciplining the perpetrators. Even worse, other teachers, coaches, and ad-
ministrators join in verbal sex- or gender-based harassment of victims, 
in essence demonstrating by their actions that this behavior is accepta-
ble and even condoned. As a result, schools have become training 
grounds for sex- and gender-based harassment in the workplace and 
other locations in society.122 But the research shows that it is not only 
 
61283/ [http://perma.cc/R6HT-KPRA]. 
 120 For a real-life example, see North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 168 F. Supp. 3d at 796–99 (describ-
ing harassment inflicted by groups of girls and boys and by individual boys and girls). 
 121 Feminist writers have criticized the “mean girls” trope. See, e.g., Jennifer Bethune and 
Marnina Gonick, Schooling the Mean Girl: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Teacher Resource Ma-
terials, 29 GENDER AND EDUCATION 389 (2017). Feminist writers consider the “mean girls” litera-
ture to be anti-girl and responsible for creating and maintaining social stereotypes about girls and 
boys and the gender-binary. Id. at 389–91. “Mean girls” texts also focus on individual behavior and 
choice as a response but ignore systemic inequality of girls in our society while perceiving girls’ 
aggressive behavior as aberrant, but biological, and boys’ aggressive behaviors as normal. Id. at 
392. Moreover, critics of the “mean girls” literature point out that it is class-based in that it sees 
upper middle-class white girls as performing relational aggression and working-class girls who are 
white or of other races as more physically and verbally aggressive. While a complete analysis of 
girls and the “mean girls” phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article, it is important not to 
accept the “mean girls” literature as merely a description of reality and to recognize that it may be 
a discourse that is responsible for creating gender differences and expectations. Id. at 393. 
 122 I am not taking the position that schools are the only training grounds for this type of har-
assment. Harassment is pervasive both in the family and throughout society as well, but schools 
have a unique role in their ability to take a stand to influence children’s views about sex and 
gender, and they participate in the harassment by either standing by or outwardly condoning it. 
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the schools where children are educated. Gender messages are ubiqui-
tous in our families and other institutions, but a reversal of the damag-
ing effects of gender in schools will only come once administrators and 
teachers are educated about gender, educate their students and their 
parents, and refuse to allow sex- and gender-based harassment to con-
tinue in the schools. Exposing schools to legal liability and penalties 
imposed by the OCR should create the proper incentives for adminis-
trators and teachers to take this education seriously. 
III. THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO PEER SEX- AND GENDER-BASED 
HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS 
A. The Courts’ Extreme Deference to School Authorities 
1.  The Supreme Court 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits a student 
from being excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or sub-
jected to discrimination under any educational program or activity that 
receives federal financial assistance.123 The Act authorizes an adminis-
trative enforcement scheme for Title IX; federal agencies with authority 
to provide financial assistance may promulgate rules, regulations, and 
orders that enforce Title IX’s objectives of assuring equal access to edu-
cational opportunities for all students, no matter their sex or gender.124 
Although the Act does not explicitly grant a private right of action for 
damages against school boards, the Supreme Court has implied a cause 
of action for damages where there is teacher-on-student harassment,125 
or student-on-student harassment.126 
Although the statute does not state standards for holding a school 
authority liable for damages, the Supreme Court adopted stringent 
standards for liability when it implied a cause of action for damages.127 
These standards have made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to pre-
vail in cases against school districts. Additionally, although the stand-
ards set forth in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education128 for peer 
harassment are very exacting, many lower courts, when applying the 
Supreme Court standards to the facts before them, have interpreted 
these standards to be even more difficult to meet than the original Su-
 
 123 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 124 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
 125 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 126 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 635 (1999). 
 127 Id.; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
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preme Court case appears to require. Thus, very few cases brought un-
der Title IX for sex- or gender-based harassment survive motions to dis-
miss or for summary judgment. 
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,129 which was 
decided the year before Davis, the Court had authorized liability of a 
school district for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student only if “an 
official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to insti-
tute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, 
and is deliberately indifferent to the teacher’s misconduct.”130 
A year later, in Davis, the Court held that a school board may face 
liability for third-party harassment of its students only where it has 
“substantial control” over both the harasser and the context in which 
the harassment occurs.131 A school board will be liable for peer sex- and 
gender-based harassment if the plaintiff proves that: 1) the school ad-
ministration had actual knowledge of the behavior; 2) exhibited delib-
erate indifference to the harassment; and 3) the harassment was so se-
vere, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denied the victim equal 
access to educational opportunities.132 A plaintiff need not show physi-
cal exclusion from the educational opportunity in order to prove a denial 
of equal access.133 Rather, a plaintiff must establish that the harass-
ment undermined and detracted from the victim’s educational experi-
ence so that she or he was effectively denied equal access to the institu-
tion’s resources and opportunities.134 In determining whether the 
behavior itself is sufficiently severe and pervasive,135 Davis cited an em-
ployment discrimination case brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, concluding that context matters. The “constellation of sur-
rounding circumstances, expectations and relationships” including, but 
not limited, to the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number 
of individuals involved must be considered.136 
Moreover, the Supreme Court counseled that schools are different 
from workplaces in that children regularly interact in ways that would 
 
 129 524 U.S. 274. 
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 136 Davis, 523 U.S. at 651, citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. 
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be unacceptable for adults.137 Thus, school students engage in “insults, 
banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is 
upsetting to the students subjected to it.”138 Damages are not available 
to victims of “simple acts of teasing and name calling among school chil-
dren” even if the comments are gendered.139 The Court also noted that 
it is possible but unlikely that a single incident of harassment would 
deny equal access to educational opportunities, and that damages 
should be limited to situations where the harassing behavior and the 
school’s indifference to it have a systemic effect on educational pro-
grams or activities.140 Finally, the Court explained that it should be eas-
ier to recover damages against a school board based on teacher-on-stu-
dent harassment than peer harassment among students.141 
Despite these rigid standards, the Court refused to affirm the lower 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. The complaint alleged that La-
Shonda Davis, a fifth-grade girl, suffered repeated sex-based physical 
and verbal harassment over a five month period by a boy in her class 
who ultimately pleaded guilty to sexual battery for his conduct.142 Both 
LaShonda and her mother told a number of teachers of the incidents, 
and one teacher told her mother that the principal had been in-
formed.143 The complaint also alleged that a group of girls (along with 
LaShonda) who were sexually harassed by the same boy attempted to 
speak to the principal, but a teacher told them that the principal would 
call them if he wanted to speak to them.144 No call was made to the 
girls.145 La Shonda’s mother, however, finally spoke to the principal who 
never took disciplinary action against the boy.146 The complaint also al-
leged that LaShonda’s grades dropped because she could not concen-
trate, and, ultimately, she wrote a suicide note.147 Finally, the com-
plaint alleged that the Board of Education had not established a policy 
on peer sexual harassment or instructed its personnel on how to re-
spond to student-on-student harassment.148 
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A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the allegations 
were sufficient to state a cause of action under Title IX because La-
Shonda was a victim of repeated verbal and physical acts of sexual har-
assment over a five-month period, and the alleged behavior was severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive.149 The allegations suggest that the 
harassment had a concrete negative effect on LaShonda, and that the 
Board had actual knowledge and responded with deliberate indifference 
when it made no effort to investigate or correct the harassment.150 
2.  The lower courts’ response to Davis 
Many of the lower courts have interpreted Gebser and Davis in the 
strictest fashion, concluding in subsequent cases with egregious facts 
that the plaintiff did not, as a matter of law, meet the Supreme Court’s 
standards. But a few other courts have taken a more measured ap-
proach to these standards. The following section analyzes cases with 
reference to individual requirements of the Supreme Court’s standard, 
and also as a whole. 
a.  Actual notice 
Davis requires that school authorities have actual notice of the har-
assment before the school has a responsibility to correct the situation. 
There are a number of questions concerning what this requirement 
means in the peer harassment cases. First, it is unclear, because of con-
flicting and insufficient caselaw, whether notice to a supervising 
teacher is sufficient to give the district actual notice. Second, it has not 
been resolved whether notice of a perpetrator’s prior harassment of the 
individual in question or of others is sufficient notice to constitute ac-
tual knowledge that would trigger the school’s responsibility to act to 
prevent more harassment. Third, where the victims are very vulnerable 
because of young age or intellectual disabilities, and therefore unable 
to communicate to school authorities in a sex-specific way, it is unclear 
what type of communication is sufficient to satisfy the actual knowledge 
requirement. 
i.  Sufficiency of notice to supervising teacher 
There remains a question as to who should have actual notice in 
the peer harassment cases. Gebser states that actual notice exists only 
if an official who has the authority to take corrective action has notice 
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of the harassment in the teacher-on-student cases.151 Given that in 
teacher-instituted harassment an administrator may be the lowest 
level person with authority to take corrective action, a number of courts 
of appeals have held that knowledge of a fellow teacher or guidance 
counselor of ongoing sexual harassment of a student by a teacher is in-
sufficient to constitute actual notice for purposes of a school district’s 
Title IX liability.152 Davis does not discuss this issue with reference to 
peer harassment, but there is a non-trivial argument that notice to a 
teacher who supervises both the perpetrator and the victim would be 
sufficient to satisfy the actual notice requirement.153 
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit declined to decide this question, 
stating that it would be necessary to study how Florida organizes its 
public schools and grants authority and responsibility by state law to 
administrators and teachers, the school district’s discrimination poli-
cies and procedures, and the facts of the particular case.154 Other courts 
have not yet decided the issue. 
ii. Notice of perpetrator’s prior harassment 
A second issue is whether school authorities’ knowledge of past har-
assment by the perpetrator is sufficient to fulfill the actual notice re-
quirement of Title IX regarding a new harassing event. The question is 
whether a victim of a perpetrator’s harassment can point to school au-
thorities’ knowledge that the perpetrator had harassed this same victim 
or a different victim in the past sufficient to constitute actual 
knowledge. If so, the question would arise as to whether school author-
ities were under a duty to remedy the past harassment and to prevent 
future harassment. 
Courts in a number of circuits conclude that notice of prior sexual 
harassment in a teacher-on-student harassment Title IX case is suffi-
cient to constitute actual notice in a subsequent case with the same 
teacher and a finding of deliberate indifference follows if the prior har-
assment is not distant in time or type from the current harassment.155 
 
 151 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998). 
 152 See, e.g., Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1265 (1997). 
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 154 Hawkins v. Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 155 See, e.g., J.M. ex rel. Morris v. Hilldale Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1-29, 2010 
WL 3516730 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010) (upholding a jury verdict holding school district liable and 
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These courts state that knowledge of prior acts of harassment is suffi-
cient to constitute actual notice to the school administration that a 
teacher is a substantial risk to the students.156 But prior notice of a uni-
versity administration of a professor’s relationships with two older non-
traditional students, ten year-old accusations of inappropriate com-
ments, and one touching incident were not sufficiently similar or close 
in time to the repeated groping and touching alleged in the later case 
before the court to constitute actual notice that would trigger the uni-
versity’s responsibility to prevent injury to the current plaintiff.157 
A lower court in the Second Circuit has concluded that, “In the con-
text of deliberate indifference, the actual notice standard may be satis-
fied by knowledge of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ where there 
have been multiple prior allegations of the same or similar conduct that 
is at issue.”158 And some courts hold that there is actual knowledge 
when there is a substantial risk created by a person whom the author-
ities know has engaged in abuse of other students.159 This reading of 
actual knowledge is more consistent with the goals of Title IX to prevent 
unequal access based on gender or sex than requiring a showing that 
school authorities had actual knowledge of the abuser’s behavior in the 
particular case. Permitting schools to wait until the harm occurs before 
they react gives schools near immunity from damages. 
iii. Actual notice when vulnerable victim unable to com-
municate in sex-specific terms 
A third related question arises as to the specificity necessary of the 
student complaint to school authorities, especially when the student 
victim is particularly vulnerable because of young age or intellectual 
disability and is unable to communicate in sex-specific terms. In a num-
ber of cases, young students and those with intellectual disabilities 
have reported to school officials in general terms that they were being 
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bothered or that their perpetrators were acting “nasty.”160 Courts have 
generally held that under these circumstances there is no actual notice 
even if the victims are very young or intellectually disabled.161 
For example, in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs Re-2 Sch. 
Dist.,162 a seventh-grade female student who was intellectually disabled 
was repeatedly coerced into performing sexual acts on a number of boys 
for a number of years. A few years into the coercive behavior, the vic-
tim’s mother asked the school psychologist to find out why the victim 
did not wish to go to school. The victim testified in her deposition that 
she told the school counselor that the boys were “bothering” her, but 
that she did not know the word “assault” at that time.163 Her personal 
therapist testified that the victim told him that she had told the coun-
selor at school about the coerced sexual behavior with the boys.164 The 
court concluded, however, that the information given to the counselor 
was insufficient to give the school actual notice that the child was being 
harassed and assaulted.165 And, the knowledge the school did have cre-
ated no responsibility to investigate further.166 
Similarly, in Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board,167 three 
eight-year-old girls (Jane Does I, II, and III) were allegedly harassed 
repeatedly over several months by an eight-year-old boy in their class 
in a series of gestures; obscene comments, such as telling them he 
wanted to “suck” their breasts, he wanted them to “suck the juice from 
his penis,” and he wanted them to “have sex with him;” and actions such 
as chasing them and touching them on their breasts and groin, attempt-
ing to kiss them, grabbing one of them and looking up her skirt, and 
rubbing his body on hers.168 The girls cried frequently, were anxious 
about going to school, and at least two of them pretended that they were 
sick on four or five occasions so they would not have to go to school.169 
Both boys and girls in the class had complained to the teacher that this 
boy was bothering them, was disruptive, and that he had pushed chil-
dren on the playground.170 At one point, Jane Doe II and two other girls 
told the teacher that he was being “disgusting.” The teacher testified, 
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however, that it was not until she spoke with Jane Doe III’s mother a 
number of months later that she heard of the explicit things John Doe 
had said and done.171 The girls testified, however, that they had repeat-
edly and persistently described his behavior to the teacher, and the 
teacher had ignored their complaints.172 
These persistent complaints of three eight-year-old girls to their 
teacher should be sufficient to create a responsibility on the teacher’s 
part to investigate the issue further. Had she investigated (or even lis-
tened to Jane Doe III), she would have found out the explicit facts of the 
boy’s behavior toward the girls. This is particularly troubling in this 
situation, as in Rost, because these victims were vulnerable due to their 
youth and may have been unable to describe the boy’s behavior explic-
itly without prompting. Clearly, these holdings protect school districts 
from liability, but they do not encourage schools to act proactively when 
they have sufficient information that should lead to a duty to investi-
gate more thoroughly general complaints from young or intellectually 
disabled children who may be incapable of explaining the assaults or 
harassment. 
b.   Deliberate indifference 
In Title IX cases, the issue of deliberate indifference is linked to 
actual knowledge.173 If there is no knowledge, it is impossible to show 
deliberate indifference. Assuming that there is actual knowledge, how-
ever, the courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard very 
strictly. Courts require that the school administration’s response to 
known harassment be clearly unreasonable. Given this standard, some 
courts have found almost any response short of ignoring the harass-
ment sufficient. At least some courts conclude that the school does not 
have to stop the harassment, nor is it clearly unreasonable if it insti-
tutes a remedy but does not meet again to decide whether to continue 
with the remedy.174 Other courts hold that if the school authorities learn 
that their remedy has been ineffective in that the remedy did not stop 
the harassment, the school can be deliberately indifferent.175 
 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. (the court ducked the issue of whether notice to the teacher alone would be sufficient 
under Title IX, concluding that even if there was actual notice and deliberate indifference, the girls 
had not been denied access to an education opportunity as a matter of law because the behavior 
was not sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and because the girls’ grades in 
school did not suffer); see also id. at 1288. 
 173 See, e.g., Gant ex. rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d. 134, 141 (2d. Cir. 1999). 
 174 See, e.g., Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 175 See, e.g., Hunter ex rel. Hunter v. Barnstable Sch. Committee, 456 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265 (D. 
Mass. 2006) (stating that there is a split in the circuits as to this issue); Wills v. Brown University, 
184, F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that once school authorities find out that their remedy—
171] SCHOOLS AS TRAINING GROUNDS FOR HARASSMENT 199 
A good example of the former is Pahssen v. Merrill Community 
School District.176 In Pahssen, John Doe, a ninth grader, committed 
three fairly serious acts of sexual harassment against Jane Doe, an 
eighth-grade girl, and ultimately raped her at school.177 When notified 
of the three incidents (before the rape), school officials met to discuss 
an Individual Education Plan (IEP) for John, who was in special educa-
tion, to determine what to do about the boy’s aggressiveness.178 The 
team decided to place John under constant adult supervision for thirty 
days, but the team never met again to decide whether to lift the super-
vision; it was automatically lifted at the expiration of thirty days.179 
Less than two months later, the boy raped the girl at school.180 Although 
both the Justice Department, which joined as an amicus, and the girls’ 
father argued in briefs that the school had shown deliberate indiffer-
ence when it failed to continue to supervise the boy after thirty days 
elapsed, the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment of the Title IX claim, holding that the school did not demon-
strate deliberate indifference.181 
In this case and others, courts repeatedly emphasize that courts 
should defer to school administrators, that schools have limited re-
sources, and that children are often cruel to each other in determining 
that the school did not act in a clearly unreasonable manner and there-
fore did not display deliberate indifference.182 The courts require that 
the harassing behavior against a particular individual reach the level 
of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and that the school know 
about it before a responsibility to react is triggered.183 But as the cases 
demonstrate, harassing behavior escalates.184 It starts as bothersome 
pushing and name calling, but soon it moves to punching and shoving, 
obscene comments and gestures, demands for oral sex, and sexual as-
sault. A school district should not escape liability for the ultimate severe 
behavior when it knows in advance that some of these behaviors are 
occurring and does nothing about it. 
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In Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger County,185 a boy who weighed less 
than eighty pounds in the seventh grade was continuously harassed, 
bullied, and battered; he was punched in the face and in the stomach, 
thrown to the floor, and kicked while he was on the floor.186 On at least 
two occasions, D.S. was pushed, and he fell and hit his head.187 On an-
other, D.S. had his face slammed into a locker and had gum put in his 
hair.188 As he was physically assaulted, D.S. was frequently called “fag-
got,” “pussy,” “pedophile,” and other insulting slurs regarding his gen-
der, sexual orientation and proclivities.189 Affidavits by third parties 
stated that a friend of D.S. witnessed students ramming D.S.’s head 
into a locker, another student threatened to kill D.S., and a third stu-
dent told D.S. to kill himself.190 This behavior occurred continuously for 
two school years, and D.S. and his mother complained after many of the 
assaults and batteries occurred.191 Despite that D.S.’s mother com-
plained repeatedly to the principal and the principal met with them a 
number of times, the situation was never cured. D.S. testified that the 
disciplinary supervisor for the county schools, Coombs, stated that he 
could not keep D.S. safe, but Coombs denied making this statement.192 
A number of investigations took place, and the instigators were pun-
ished, but to no avail.193 
The court held that as a matter of law the school district did not 
show deliberate indifference because it engaged in a number of investi-
gations, gave in-school suspensions to some of the harassers, and 
changed class scheduling to separate D.S. from his harassers.194 The 
Sixth Circuit had held earlier in Vance v. Spencer County195 that there 
was a jury question of deliberate indifference when school officials had 
actual knowledge that its efforts to cure the problem did not work and 
continued to use those same efforts unsuccessfully.196 However, in 
Stiles, it distinguished Vance, stating that the school had made many 
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efforts and there were almost no repeat offenders in the Stiles case, un-
like in Vance.197 
The court in Stiles also distinguished Patterson v. Hudson Area 
Schools198 largely because school officials had reason to believe in Stiles 
that D.S. was “at least an occasional instigator” of some of the physical 
confrontations.199 The court’s adoption of this “defense” to a possible 
finding of deliberate indifference appears to add an “unwelcomeness” 
requirement into Title IX’s already stringent standards.200 This is an 
inappropriate standard to graft onto the situation of a middle school boy 
who suffers serious physical and verbal harassment, much of which, if 
reported to the police, would constitute crimes against him. Grafting an 
unwelcomeness requirement in this situation only serves to reward the 
true perpetrators and to let the school off the hook for its failures to 
control the situation. 
Clearly, these are very complicated situations, and there was some 
attempt by school officials in Stiles to remedy the situation, but a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that at some point during the two-year pe-
riod of harassment it became obvious that the school’s efforts to stop the 
harassment were not working. At that point, a jury could conclude that 
the school operated with deliberate indifference when it did not report 
the abusers to the police and did not suspend or expel the abusers or 
engage in any other disciplinary measure designed to stop the harass-
ment. This case demonstrates the difficulty of meeting the deliberate 
indifference standard. While this standard was intentionally set by the 
Supreme Court so as not to permit undue interference with the educa-
tional prerogatives of school officials, this case demonstrates that, at 
least as it was interpreted in this case, it does not serve to protect school 
children from gender-based discrimination. Even given allegations of 
grossly dangerous harassment and bullying that rises to the level of 
encouraging suicide, criminal batteries, and other severe behaviors, the 
court concluded as a matter of law that the school’s knowing ineffective 
response was not deliberate indifference. 
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c. Severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sufficient to 
deny equal access to educational opportunities 
The severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive standard is linked 
to whether the behavior is serious enough to deny equal access to school 
opportunities because of the individual’s sex or gender. In determining 
whether illegal harassment occurred, it would make sense, then, to take 
into account the ages of victims and the victims’ subjective reaction to 
the harassment as well as to its objective severity, but courts do not 
always do so. In Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board,201 for ex-
ample, the court concluded that the behavior was “not so severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive that it had the systemic effect of denying 
the [three eight-year-old girl victims] equal access to education.”202 The 
court stated that the effect must be systemic, which means that a single 
instance of one-on-one peer harassment would be insufficient, and “the 
effects of the harassment [must] touch the whole or entirety of an edu-
cational program or activity.”203 This standard is incorrect. Other courts 
have held that one single incident, if sufficiently severe, can deprive an 
individual victim of access to equal educational opportunities.204 
Moreover, in Hawkins, the victims alleged ongoing, repeated verbal 
and physical harassment of a sexual nature. But the court noted that 
the girls did not suffer sufficiently. The court stated: 
None of the girls suffered a decline in grades and none of their 
teachers observed any change in their demeanor in classroom 
participation. The girls simply testify that they were upset about 
the harassment, although not enough to tell their parents until 
months after it began. Two of the girls say they faked being sick 
four or five times in order not to go to school. This falls short of 
demonstrating a systemic effect of denying equal access to an 
educational program or activity.205 
How should a victim prove that there has been a systemic effect on 
the entire educational program? It seems odd that a statute that was 
intended to protect women and girls from unequal educations would re-
quire them to suffer in the extreme in order to get their education. As 
Justice O’Connor stated for the Court in the Title VII context in Harris 
v. Forklift Systems: 206 
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But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads 
to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work envi-
ronment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psy-
chological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ 
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the 
job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, 
even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that 
the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it cre-
ated a work environment abusive to employees because of their 
race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad 
rule of workplace equality.207 
The behavior in question in Hawkins certainly created an unequal 
educational environment for the girls who were harassed. It would 
make little sense to assume that denial of equal access depends merely 
on the subjective emotional strength or weakness of the victim or on the 
systemic effect of the harassment. As in Title VII coverage, Title IX 
should protect victims before they have psychological breakdowns.208   
A number of other courts have concluded that harassing behavior 
is not sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as a mat-
ter of law. For example, in Pahssen, the court concluded that three acts 
of harassment by a ninth-grade boy—smashing the eighth-grade female 
victim up against her locker, telling her that if she did not perform oral 
sex on the perpetrator that he would no longer hang out with her, and 
making obscene gestures at the victim as she was playing basketball in 
a public arena at school—were insufficient to create a genuine issue of 
fact as to severity, pervasiveness, and objective offensiveness sufficient 
to trigger the school’s responsibility to protect the victim who was later 
raped by the same boy.209 
In contrast, T.Z. v. City of New York210 concluded that one serious 
episode of sexual harassment was sufficiently severe that it may have 
had the effect of denying a student’s access to equal educational bene-
fits. Even though the language uses the terms “severe and pervasive,” 
the court concluded that the “severe and pervasive and objectively of-
fensive” standard’s purpose was to predict whether the plaintiff would 
 
 207 Id. at 22. 
 208 Judge Illana Rovner would likely agree. See Gabrielle M. v. Park Forrest-Chicago Heights, 
Illinois Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 827–28 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J., concurring) (concluding 
that a female five year-old kindergartener can suffer even if the perpetrator, also a kindergartener, 
may not be able to form the intent to harass; it is the school’s intent and response, not that of the 
young perpetrator, that matters; Gabrielle’s sleepless nights, bed wetting, loss of appetite, and 
emotional distress were sufficient to find unequal access to educational opportunities). 
 209 Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 210 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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suffer unequal access.211 Given the serious sexual assaults that the 
plaintiff suffered in a classroom with the teacher present, and the seri-
ous effects on the plaintiff’s mental health that included sleeplessness, 
panic attacks, PTSD, and self-cutting, the court held that this single 
instance of sexual assault (perpetrated by a number of boys) was suffi-
cient to rise to the level of “pervasiveness;” therefore, there was a ques-
tion for the jury.212 Unlike many of the other cases decided above, I sub-
mit, this case was correctly decided. 
d.  Because of sex 
Under Title IX in schools and Title VII in workplaces, sex- or gen-
der-based harassment is illegal only if it occurs because of the victim’s 
sex.213 Many courts deciding Title VII cases have trouble recognizing 
that harassment occurs because of sex in the same-sex environment.214 
This problem occurs most frequently under two circumstances. First, 
although same-sex harassment is illegal under Title VII,215 up until 
very recently all federal courts had held that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation was not prohibited sex discrimination.216 Thus, these 
courts concluded that as a matter of law, based on language used in the 
workplace, the discrimination occurred because of the victim’s sexual 
orientation, not his sex, and was therefore not illegal.217 Fortunately, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a number of 
courts of appeals have recently concluded that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is discrimination based on sex.218 But there is a seri-
ous question whether the U.S. Supreme Court, considering its current 
composition, will agree with these decisions, and a number of cases 
dealing with this issue are currently before the Supreme Court.219 
 
 211 Id. at 269. 
 212 Id. at 271. 
 213 Of course, Title VII also forbids discrimination in workplaces that occur because of race, 
color, national origin, or religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 214 See MCGINLEY, supra note 9, at 46–48. 
 215 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 216 See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employ-
ment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 713, 714 n.3, 732 (2010). 
 217 This distinction would be very difficult to make. See id. at 738–44. 
 218 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(cause of action exists under Title VII for sex discrimination); Baldwin, 2012-24738-FAA-03 (2015) 
(concluding that sexual orientation discrimination prohibited by Title VII); compare, Macy v. Dep’t 
of Justice, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012) (concluding that 
transgender status protected under Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination). 
 219 Bostock v. Clayton Cty, Georgia, 723 Fed. App’x. 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (sexual orientation is 
not covered by Title VII); cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599, 203 L. Ed. 2d 754 (April 22, 2019) (No. 17-
1618); Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (a cause of action exists 
under Title VII for sexual orientation discrimination), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599, 203 L. Ed. 2d 
754 (April 22, 2019) (No. 17-1623). Compare, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. 
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The second issue that arises in Title VII cases regarding “because 
of sex” results from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins’s220 holding that the 
statute prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s failure to con-
form (or hyper-conformity) 221 to gender stereotypes. In other words, dis-
crimination “because of sex” also includes discrimination because of 
gender. Even if the Supreme Court holds that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is not prohibited by Title VII, the sex stereotyping doctrine 
allows causes of action for harassment that results from an individual’s 
failure to conform (or hyper-conformity) to gender stereotypes, whether 
the plaintiff is LGBTQ+ or straight. 
Even in cases brought under Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc.222 and the sex stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse, how-
ever, some lower courts have had trouble concluding, especially when 
men harass other men, that the behavior occurred because of sex. They 
conclude, instead, that the behavior is merely normal “roughhousing” 
or “hazing.”223 This error results from a misreading of Oncale. The Court 
mentions in Oncale that there is no Title VII cause of action for rough-
housing or hazing that is not sufficiently severe or pervasive. But the 
Oncale court never held that roughhousing behavior that is severe 
and/or pervasive is not actionable. Lower courts, without focusing 
closely on Oncale, use this statement to hold that the behavior is rough-
housing, and, therefore, it did not occur because of sex. These decisions 
are wrong because they distort Oncale’s language and meaning. 
Masculinities theory also proves them to be wrong. Masculinities 
theory explains that severe or pervasive harassment of men by men of-
ten occurs because of sex because the harassers are motivated by the 
victim’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes and/or they harass the 
victim in order to enhance their own masculinity, to buttress the mas-
culinity of their group, and to police the masculine norms of the work-
place.224 
 
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (a cause of action exists under 
Title VII for discrimination based on transgender status), pet. cert. filed (No. 18-107), June 24, 
2018. The petitions for certiorari were granted on April 22, 2019 in all three of these cases. See 
Amy Howe, Court to Take Up LGBT Rights in the Workplace, available at https://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2019/04/court-to-take-up-lgbt-rights-in-the-workplace/. 
 220 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 221 By “hyper-conformity,” I refer to discrimination or harassment motivated by the female 
victim’s extreme performance of femininity or the male victim’s extreme performance of masculin-
ity. 
 222 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 223 See, e.g., Doe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Conn. 2016). 
 224 See, McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6. 
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While less frequently, some courts deciding Title IX same-sex cases 
also conclude that harassment does not occur because of sex either be-
cause the behavior occurred because of the victim’s sexual orientation225 
or because the behavior is normal roughhousing or hazing among boys. 
The mantra “boys will be boys” excuses the behavior as normal and not 
occurring because of sex. 
In Doe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ.,226 for example, the plaintiff, John 
Doe, attended high school from Fall 2011 until Spring 2013, and was 
regularly brutalized, bullied, and harassed by his classmates and his 
teachers, coaches, and a paraprofessional working in the school.227 His 
physical and verbal harassment culminated in a number of physical and 
sexual assaults, including a rape at summer camp; after the rape, stu-
dents repeatedly harassed him in class, calling him a “faggot” and a “fat 
ass.”228 Doe’s special education teacher characterized the assaults as 
“everyday banter between boys” and did not take action.229 Finally, 
Doe’s mother withdrew him from school when a State Trooper informed 
her that that Doe had been sexually assaulted and that the police would 
be filing a report on a second incident.230 The court dismissed the Title 
IX claim because it did not “sufficiently allege that he was bullied, har-
assed and assaulted because of his gender” and, because the sexual as-
sault took place in the summer off school grounds, the school would not 
be liable.231 This case employs a piecemeal approach to analyzing the 
evidence, refusing to recognize the severely hostile educational environ-
ment that was tolerated and created by school officials as well as the 
 
 225 See, e.g., Tumminello v. Father Ryan High School, No. 3:15-cv-00684, 2015 WL 13215456 
(6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where the victim’s mother alleged 
that her freshman son committed suicide after he was targeted with belts used as whips by other 
students who called him “faggot,” and “gay” and told him to “go home and kill himself,” holding 
that the Sixth Circuit had rejected the sex stereotyping theory and the theory that harassment 
based on sexual harassment occurred because of sex); Eilenfeldt ex rel. J.M. v. United C.U.S.D. 
#304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F. Supp. 3d 834, 838–42 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that merely using sexual 
behavior or language does not necessarily show the behavior occurred because of male seventh 
grade victim’s sex, and refusing to recognize at least in this case that the behavior may have oc-
curred for the victim’s failure to conform to gender norms even though the complaint alleged that 
the harassment included inappropriate touching by other boys and students verbally taunting the 
victim that he was a “rapist,” “pedophile,” and a child molester, saying he was attracted to young 
boys, and physically bullying him by kicking, punching, pushing him, and threatening him with a 
knife). 
 226 179 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Conn. 2016). 
 227 Id. at 184–88. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 186. 
 230 Id. at 187. The athletes in this school were engaged in other allegedly criminal behavior 
against girls and boys. Two football players were charged and arrested for rape of minor girls; 
another football player was charged with felony robbery related to jumping three fourteen-year-
old boys. Another football player was later arrested for the second assault of two thirteen-year-old 
girls. Id. at 188. 
 231 Id. at 197–98. 
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acts of physical, verbal, and sexual assaults directed at the plaintiff, 
who regularly reported his attacks to school officials. Even the off-cam-
pus assault likely had its origins in school-based hostilities. 
Another related barrier to liability for damages is the courts’ will-
ingness to accept a school’s defense that it knew about some behaviors 
but did not know the behaviors had occurred on the basis of sex.232 
Courts erroneously conceive of behaviors as simple bullying and ignore 
gender-based motives.233 Simple bullying without a gender motive is not 
illegal under Title IX. But behaviors that courts dismiss as simple “bul-
lying” are often the same as those that meet the definition of “sexual” 
or “gender-based” harassment under the law.234 Moreover, if we look 
closely at the behavior, we can recognize a gender motive in most of 
these cases. 
For example, in K.S. v. Northwest Independent School District,235 
classmates ridiculed a sixth-grade boy because he had large breasts, 
calling him “titty boy” and “Teddy titty baby.”236 Students touched and 
twisted his breasts in the locker room, hallways, and other parts of the 
school.237 According to the court, however, this behavior was insufficient 
to notify the school of “anything more than middle-school bullying.”238 
These “bullying” behaviors, however, should constitute illegal sexual 
 
 232 The next three paragraphs are largely derived from McGinley, Masculinity Motivation, su-
pra note 6. 
 233 See N.K. v. St. Mary’s Springs Acad. Of Fond Du Lac, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1033 (E.D. Wis. 
2013) (citing to cases that hold that the harassment occurred because of personal animus rather 
than sex, gender, or race). 
 234 See McGinley, supra note 19,  at 1191–92 (concluding that the behaviors involved in male-
on-male bullying and harassment are the same); Dorothy L. Espelage et al., Longitudinal Associ-
ations Among Bullying, Homophobic Teasing, and Sexual Violence Perpetration Among Middle 
School Students, 30 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2541, 2544, 2554 (2015) (concluding that “[b]ul-
lying is in many ways a gendered phenomenon” and finding that male behavior characterized as 
bullying escalates to sexual harassment later on). Although social scientists distinguish between 
bullying and sexual harassment, the gendered bullying they describe meets Title VII’s and Title 
IX’s definition of behavior occurring “because of sex.” Although it may prove too much to consider 
all bullying to be masculinities-based, a full appreciation of the animating forces behind bullying 
suggests that most of it results from the Masculinity Motivation and, if properly understood, would 
be actionable pursuant to Titles VII and IX. 
 235 689 F. App’x 780 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 236 Id. at 781. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 787 n.8; see also Doe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 179, 185, 197–98 (D. 
Conn. 2016) (finding taunting and comments such as “faggot,” “fat ass,” “pussy,” “bitch,” and 
“baby,” insufficient to conclude that the behavior occurred because of sex); J.H. v. Sch. Town of 
Munster, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1092–93 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (calling a male high school student names 
such as “cunt,” “pussy,” and “bitch” is insufficient evidence to show it occurred because of sex); 
Eilenfeldt ex rel. J.M. v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F. Supp. 3d 834, 838, 842 (C.D. Ill. 
2015) (dismissing complaint where harassers called junior high student “rapist,” “pedophile,” and 
“child molester” and concluding that the victim was not harassed for being male or insufficiently 
masculine and that it was “nothing more nor less than schoolyard cruelty and near-arbitrary ani-
mosity”). 
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and gender-based harassment. They are severe, pervasive, and objec-
tively offensive, and they occur because of the plaintiff’s failure to com-
ply with expectations and stereotypes of how a boy should look and act. 
In other words, they occur because of the victim’s perceived failed mas-
culinity. “Harassing those who violate prescribed gender norms helps 
to sustain male privilege and power and serves to preserve the status 
quo while maintaining the division of labor among the sexes.”239 
Masculinities theory posits that perpetrators seek to enhance their 
own power in school—to make the boys more masculine and, when girls 
are involved in this type of harassment, to uphold the gender hierarchy 
of how boys and girls should look, act, and interact. Masculinities stud-
ies explain that boys and men symbolically turn other boys and men 
into girls or women by harassing and assaulting them sexually. By con-
verting male victims into symbolic females, the harassers denigrate the 
victims and demonstrate their superiority to each other and the vic-
tims.240 
Finally, some courts hold that using sex- or gender-based language 
or behavior is insufficient to prove that the behavior occurred because 
of sex or gender, especially where the student has another reason for 
ridicule—in this case, a disability.241 Most problematic, most of these 
cases are either dismissed in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Failing to understand 
these intersectional claims and to recognize that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the behavior constituted illegal sex discrimination under 
Title IX, these courts deny children who suffer from serious harassment 
their days in court. 
 
 239 Brenda L. Russell & Debra Oswald, When Sexism Cuts Both Ways: Predictors of Tolerance 
of Sexual Harassment of Men, 19 MEN & MASCULINITIES 524, 528 (2016). 
 240 See Paula McDonald & Sara Charlesworth, Workplace Sexual Harassment at the Margins, 
30 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 118, 129 (2016) (noting that findings of male-on-male sexual harassment 
supported the view that the purpose of such harassment is to enforce traditional heterosexual male 
gender roles and that complaints by men in the study included taunts about “apparently unmas-
culine” conduct and “insinuations” that victims were gay); cf. Kathryn J. Holland et al., Sexual 
Harassment Against Men: Examining the Roles of Feminist Activism, Sexuality, and Organiza-
tional Context, 17 PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 17, 18 (2016) (citing Jennifer L. Berdahl, Har-
assment Based on Sex: Protecting Social Status in the Context of Gender Hierarchy, 32 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 641 (2007)). 
 241 See, e.g., Preston v. Hilton Cent. Sch. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 2d 235, 238–40 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(holding that victim who had Asperger’s Syndrome could not make out a cause of action for gender 
discrimination even though he was called “gay,” “homo,” “bitch,” and “faggot,” and was constantly 
subjected to vulgar and offensive language such as being asked whether he watched pornography, 
was gay, or masturbated, and whether he would perform oral sex on another male student, and 
once a male student asked if he could “put [his] dick in [the victim’s] ass” because the plaintiff 
could not prove it was the victim’s gender and not his disability that caused the behavior). 
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e.  How the standard operates as a whole 
While each of these parts of the Davis standard individually may 
appear to balance the interests of the potential victims against those of 
school districts to avoid expensive judgments, the way many courts in-
terpret and apply these standards as a whole creates a nearly impossi-
ble barrier to school district liability for damages when cases are 
brought against them. Plaintiffs walk a virtual gauntlet of barriers to a 
Title IX victory. This application of the legal standards does little to 
encourage schools to be aware of the risks presented by particular stu-
dents and to try to avoid the risks of harm to the other children in the 
school. In fact, given the discomfort that courts of appeals appear to 
have with lawsuits against school authorities, it may be that legal in-
terpretation actually serves to discourage school authorities from acting 
responsibly in the face of known risks. The result: young children in 
schools (who are required to be there) have much less protection from 
sex- and gender-based harassment and assault than their adult coun-
terparts in workplaces. In fact, the school authorities whom we must 
trust to care for and educate our children are held to a much lower 
standard than employers who permit hostile work environments to oc-
cur. The policy behind Title IX makes clear that unequal access to edu-
cational opportunities based on sex or gender is illegal. While schools 
have important and expensive educational programs, those programs 
cannot be allocated on the basis of sex and school districts should be 
held to an equal grant of opportunities to its children. Given the little 
success that Title IX cases have, it appears that this standard does little 
to assure equal access to school programs. 
Under Title VII, employers are liable for their negligence when 
they have knowledge or constructive knowledge of a sexually harassing 
environment created by peers and do not respond promptly and ade-
quately to correct the problem.242 Thus, if an adult at work is harassed 
by a co-worker or a group of coworkers or if there is a sexually harassing 
environment in the workplace caused by peers, the employer will be li-
able for money damages caused by the harassment if it acts negligently 
by failing to investigate the situation and failing to take prompt reme-
dial action. While this standard, given the courts’ interpretation, is of-
ten not sufficient in the workplace to protect plaintiffs from having their 
cases dismissed improvidently, the Title IX standard, as interpreted, 
requires young children to negotiate extremely hostile conditions with-
out holding schools responsible. 
 
 242 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 
421 (2013). 
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Consider Pahssen v. Merrill Community School District—the facts 
and risks known to the school, the school’s response, and the predictable 
harm that eventually took place.243 In Pahssen,244 John Doe, the ninth-
grade perpetrator of numerous violent acts, including the rape of Jane 
Doe, an eighth-grade student, had been in trouble regularly for years: 
suspended for sexual harassment245 and for physically attacking other 
students, and arrested twice for sexual assault.246 
During the first few weeks back after a year’s suspension, John Doe 
committed three acts of sexual harassment against Jane Doe. 247 The 
victim’s stepfather wrote a letter to the school administration demand-
ing that something be done about this boy whom he correctly believed 
was a “volcano” ready to erupt.248 At that point, John Doe was placed on 
thirty days of adult supervision. Less than two months later, John Doe 
raped Jane Doe on school property.249 The School Board expelled John 
Doe forty days later upon the recommendation of the Superintendent. 
Jane Doe’s mother filed suit against the school, and the federal dis-
trict judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all 
causes of action, including a Title IX count for sex discrimination.250 The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, con-
cluding that three incidents of harassment of Jane Doe that preceded 
the rape were not severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as a mat-
ter of law; the incidents of sexual harassment against other individuals 
of which Merrill should have been on notice could not be considered in 
determining whether John Doe posed a risk to Jane Doe,251 and the 
court could not take into account those other incidents of which the de-
fendant had notice in determining whether the three incidents against 
Jane Doe were severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.252 
Second, the court held that even if the three incidents triggered the 
school’s responsibility to act, it did act by holding the IEP meeting and 
determining to have constant adult supervision of John Doe for thirty 
days. The school, therefore, did not act with deliberate indifference at 
that point.253 
 
 243 Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 244 These facts are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as this case was decided on 
a motion for summary judgment. 
 245 Id. at 361. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at 360. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 359. 
 251 See id. 
 252 Id. at 363. 
 253 Id. at 364. 
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While the court’s analysis appears to track the requirements set 
forth in Davis, a closer look at the court’s conclusions demonstrates that 
it interprets Davis’s strict standards in a way that makes it impossible 
for an injured plaintiff to recover in a Title IX case against the school 
district. First, at the very least, the three sexually harassing incidents 
suffered by Jane Doe before the rape should be sufficient to go to a jury 
to determine whether the behavior was severe, pervasive, and objec-
tively offensive. This case deals with a girl in the beginning of eighth 
grade—likely thirteen years old—whose “boyfriend” commits a physical 
assault on her, threatens her with a demand of oral sex, and makes 
obscene gestures toward her in public. Clearly, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that this behavior was sufficient to deny the victim equal ac-
cess to educational opportunities. Instead, the court held that as a mat-
ter of law the sexually harassing behavior was not sufficiently severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive. And, the court concluded, even if it 
were, the school authorities reacted sufficiently when they became 
aware of these behaviors by calling an IEP meeting to discuss John Doe 
and subjecting him to adult supervision for thirty days. Once again, the 
court decides a factual question as a matter of law: according to the 
court, school authorities did not act with deliberate indifference when 
they discontinued adult supervision of John Doe even though they did 
not even meet again to assure that the thirty-day adult supervision was 
adequate. 
Moreover, in determining that the school did not act with deliber-
ate indifference as a matter of law, the court refused to permit consid-
eration of the school’s prior experience with John Doe and actual 
knowledge of his misbehavior. The rape confirms the danger that John 
Doe posed both to Jane Doe and to other children at school, and, fortu-
nately, the school expelled John Doe forty days later. But its inadequate 
discipline of a child who was clearly about to erupt and failure to protect 
Jane Doe should be sufficient to send the issue of deliberate indifference 
of school authorities at Merrill to the jury. There is no question that 
Jane Doe suffered severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive behavior 
that denied her access to educational opportunities because of her sex 
and that the school authorities had actual knowledge of John Doe’s 
criminal behavior toward both Jane Doe and others but made little at-
tempt to protect his most likely target from him. In slavishly applying 
the deliberate indifference standard, the court not only refused to hold 
the school accountable, but also refused to permit a jury to do so. 
Pahssen is not an outlier among the cases decided under Title IX. 
In most of the reported cases the courts of appeal hold that there is no 
liability under Title IX as a matter of law without allowing a jury to 
determine what seem to be genuine issues of material fact, even in the 
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face of severe gender- and/or sex-based harassment that the school offi-
cials either knew about and ignored or participated in. 
As we shall see in the next subsection, this has not been the case 
with the administrative investigations of complaints by the OCR, but 
things might soon change to the detriment of claimants. 
B.  Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education: Changing 
Norms 
The other important enforcement arm of Title IX is the Office of 
Civil Rights of the Department of Education (“OCR”). The OCR issues 
rules, guidance, and interpretations, including “Dear Colleague” letters 
and “Questions and Answers” that explain and interpret the law. It also 
investigates complaints by students (and their parents) alleging that 
their schools have discriminated against them under Title IX based on 
their sex or gender, under Title VI based on their race, color, or national 
origin, and under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act based on their 
disability. 
Once the OCR determines that a complaint is timely and within its 
jurisdiction, it decides whether an investigation is necessary.254 Upon 
opening an investigation, it requests documents from the alleged victim 
and the accused school district and interviews the claimants (who in the 
pre-college context are usually the parents of the students who have 
allegedly been subject to harassment), the student victim, and school 
officials.255 The OCR determines whether there is sufficient evidence 
(using the preponderance of the evidence standard) that the alleged vic-
tim suffered harassment and, as a result, a denial of access to equal 
educational opportunities.256 While the investigation proceeds, the OCR 
considers whether the school district policies, training programs for ad-
ministrators and teachers, and reporting mechanisms are adequate. 
Eventually, if the OCR concludes that the recipient has not complied 
with the law, it attempts to reach a Resolution Agreement with the 
school district that sets out requirements for compliance.257 If the school 
district refuses, the OCR has the power to begin the very rare process 
to cease federal funding of the institution. 
After Gebser and Davis were decided, the Department of Education 
issued its permanent revised Title IX guidance on sexual harassment 
 
 254 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C. R., COMPLAINT PROCESSING PROCEDURES (Nov. 
2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/complaints-how.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5BV-
SLQF]. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See OCR Complaint Processing Procedures, supra note 254. 
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in 2001.258 The 2001 Revised Guidance replaced the 1997 guidance.259 
All administrations subsequent to the 2001 Revised Guidance—both 
Republican and Democratic (including the Trump Administration)—
have followed the 2001 Revised Guidance. The 2001 Revised Guidance 
explained that the Supreme Court limited the actual knowledge and 
deliberate indifference standards used in Gebser and Davis to court 
cases of private parties seeking monetary damages only and did not ap-
ply to OCR investigations.260 Nor would the courts’ stringent standards 
apply, the 2001 Revised Guidance opines, to plaintiffs in court cases 
seeking injunctions and equitable relief and no monetary damages.261 
Moreover, the Revised Guidance states that the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the power of the Department of Education to enforce Ti-
tle IX even in cases where there would not be money damages.262 Be-
cause there are no money damages resulting from the OCR’s finding of 
noncompliance, the 2001 Revised Guidance stated that the OCR would 
continue to use a negligence standard (like that used before Gebser and 
Davis, under the 1997 Guidance)—schools’ knowledge or reason to know 
about harassment would trigger a responsibility to investigate and 
promptly remedy the issue. 263 The next subsection analyzes the differ-
ences between the courts’ and the OCR’s standards in deciding Title IX 
cases. 
1.  Courts’ vs. the OCR’s legal interpretations 
The 2001 Revised Guidance interpretations vigorously protect the 
rights of children who are abused in pre-college and college settings,264 
and they stand in stark contrast to the meager protections provided by 
the courts in litigation brought for peer-harassment in schools under 
Title IX. Many (likely, the majority) of the OCR investigations in pre-
college cases result in findings that the school discriminated against the 
alleged victim and in Resolution Agreements between the OCR and the 
accused school districts. 
In contrast to the courts’ legal standards and requirements under 
Title IX, unlike the courts’ requirement of actual knowledge, OCR re-
quires that the school district have knowledge or reason to know that 
 
 258 See Notice of availability, 66 Fed. Reg. 5512 (Jan. 19, 2001) (hereinafter “2001 Revised 
Guidance”). 
 259 See Final Policy Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 49 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
 260 See 2001 Revised Guidance, supra note 258, Preamble, at ii-iv. 
 261 Id. at iv n.2. 
 262 Id. 
 263 See 2001 Revised Guidance, supra note 258. 
 264 It also protected the interests of victims of sexual violence in colleges and universities, but 
I am focusing in this article on harassment occurring in pre-college situations. 
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the harassing behavior was occurring or had occurred.265 Once school 
authorities have reason to know about harassment, they have a respon-
sibility to investigate and engage in a prompt remedial response if har-
assment has occurred. If the initial remedy is not effective, schools have 
an ongoing obligation to assure that the victim does not continue to ex-
perience harassment from the harasser(s).266 This obligation contrasts 
with the courts’ requirement that the school with actual knowledge act 
with deliberate indifference to the harassment in order to be liable un-
der Title IX. As explained above, the deliberate indifference standard, 
as interpreted by at least some of the courts, requires only minimal ac-
tion from the school.267 Literally, so long as the schools engage in half-
baked efforts to stop the harassing, they are safe in the courts. The 
courts require a showing that the school’s response be “clearly unrea-
sonable” for a finding of deliberate indifference, a far greater showing 
than the OCR requires in order to find the school district noncompli-
ant.268 
There are other important differences between how the OCR inves-
tigators have interpreted Title IX when investigating a complaint and 
how courts interpret Title IX when deciding a case. The OCR investiga-
tions and resolutions evidence an approach that is considerably more 
demanding of schools and, consequently, more protective of students 
who are harassed by peers. OCR investigations have concluded: 
 A police investigation does not relieve schools of continu-
ing obligations to investigate and remedy discrimination 
under Title IX;269 
 Schools must take interim steps to protect the alleged vic-
tims before the final outcome of the investigation;270 
 Schools should not generally remove the complainant 
from classes while allowing the alleged perpetrator to re-
main;271 
 It is improper to require the complainant to work out the 
problem directly with the alleged perpetrator; 272 
 
 265 See 2001 Revised Guidance, supra note 258. 
 266 Id. 
 267 See, e.g., Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 268 See, Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 635 (1999). 
 269 See Perris Union, supra note 86. 
 270 See West Contra Costal, supra note 87. 
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 A recipient of federal funds must process all complaints 
of sexual violence or assault (even if the allegations indi-
cate that the behavior occurred off campus) to determine 
whether the conduct occurred in an off-campus education 
program or if not, had continuing effects on campus.273 
2.  Procedural differences between courts’ and the OCR’s deter-
minations 
To make matters worse for victims who sue in court, most of the 
cases are decided for the defendants on motions to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment.274 The strict application of the substantive legal stand-
ard, combined with the federal courts’ proclivity to dispose of the cases 
procedurally, allows for an emotional distance between the decision 
makers (the judges) and the plaintiffs. When there is no trial, neither 
judges nor juries must face the victim’s pain as he or she relates the 
story from the witness box. It’s more efficient this way, especially in the 
context of the federal judiciary that considers itself overburdened and 
works to dispose of cases quickly. Contrast the judges’ lack of connection 
to the victims with the relationship that OCR investigators have with 
the victims based on interviewing the witnesses—the parents of the vic-
tim, and, depending on the victim’s age, the victim as well, and the 
school authorities. The OCR investigator is likely to experience the 
emotional power of the plaintiff’s situation as no federal judge will do 
so if the case in court is decided on the papers using strict substantive 
standards. Although some would say that legal decision makers should 
be emotionally distant from the subjects whose fate they decide, a 
purely rational approach to the law that shields the decision maker 
from empathy may not yield the best result.275 The OCR investigator, 
therefore, because of his or her personal connection to the complainant 
and school officials, is more likely to understand the dynamics of the 
situation that happened in the school. This leads us to an analysis of 
the changes the Obama OCR made in its 2011 and 2014 “Dear Col-
league” letter and “Questions and Answers,” the Trump Administra-
tion’s rescission of these interpretations, and the proposed new regula-
tions by the Trump Administration. 
 
 273 See Greenup Cty. Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 03141163, (Mar. 18, 2015). 
 274 I have read all peer harassment cases decided under Title IX and published or available 
online through Westlaw since 2012, and the vast majority are decided for the defendants on pro-
cedural motions. 
 275 See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH L. REV. 1574, 1576–77 (1987) 
(explaining that better legal decisions are made when empathy, which includes both emotion and 
cognition, is present). 
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3. Obama Administration’s OCR: new interpretations 
While honoring the 2001 Revised Guidance, the Obama Admin-
istration’s OCR issued a number of “Dear Colleague” letters and “Ques-
tions and Answers” with added interpretations of Title IX. These 
Obama Administration interpretations (April 4, 2011 “Dear Colleague” 
letter, and April 29, 2014 “Questions and Answers”) required, among 
other things, that schools’ and colleges’ grievance processes use the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the accused 
was responsible; they also banned use of mediation to resolve a conflict 
between the accuser and the accused when sexual assault is alleged.276 
On September 22, 2017, the Trump Administration rescinded the 
Obama Administration’s April 4, 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter and the 
April 29, 2014 “Questions and Answers”277 and issued a “Dear Col-
league” letter and “Questions and Answers” of its own.”278 While some 
provisions in both the Obama and Trump Administrations’ documents 
may apply universally to elementary and secondary schools, both focus 
on college processes in sexual assault proceedings. The Trump rescis-
sion permits colleges to use either the “preponderance of the evidence” 
or “clear and convincing evidence” standard, permits voluntary media-
tion, and clarifies that cross examination is permitted.279 The Trump 
Administration “Dear Colleague” letter also states that it will issue pro-
posed regulations and use the notice and comment process to promul-
gate new regulations.280 
 
 276 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TITLE IX, SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT (Apr. 4, 2011); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2011). 
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(2017)]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON CAMPUS SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT (2017) [hereinafter Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2017)]. For a list of Guid-
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 278 DEP’T OF EDUC. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (2017), supra note 277; Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL 
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4.  Trump Administration’s OCR: proposed regulations 
On November 29, 2018, the Secretary of Education issued proposed 
regulations that would govern the OCR decision making process.281 The 
focus of the proposed regulations is post-secondary enforcement of Title 
IX; the proposed regulations address concerns about colleges’ and uni-
versities’ investigations and grievance proceedings resulting from 
claims of sexual violence on campus. A discussion of the proposed rules’ 
effects on college campuses, however, is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.282 
This article deals with Title IX’s effectiveness in eliminating peer 
sex- and gender-based harassment in elementary, middle, and second-
ary schools; viewing the proposed regulations through this lens reveals 
a serious likelihood that sex- and gender-based harassment would in-
crease if the new regulations become law. The proposed regulations 
would radically change the law as it applies to elementary, middle, and 
secondary schools and the procedures that the OCR uses to enforce Title 
IX in those institutions. They would not only reverse Obama Admin-
istration 2011 guidance, which has already been rescinded, but, more 
importantly, would also overturn the 2001 Revised Guidance that has 
been followed by all of the presidential administrations for the past 
eighteen years. The new law would adopt new stringent standards for 
finding a school district noncompliant. If these stringent standards be-
come law, they will seriously harm the rights of children to equal access 
to education based on their sex and gender. Particularly at a time when 
law and institutions are responding to the #MeToo movement, this 
change would represent a serious setback that may affect generations 
to come. In essence, the proposed regulations create disincentives for 
schools to educate themselves and their students about the causes of 
illegal sex- and gender-based harassment, the importance of avoiding 
these behaviors, and of acting promptly when the behaviors occur. 
Schools will solidify their roles as training grounds for future genera-
tions of harassers. 
 
 281 As I write this article, the notice and comment period has still not elapsed. It is unclear 
whether the proposed regulations will be adopted, and if so, whether there will be changes made 
to them. I focus here on the most problematic ones for pre-college students. 
 282 For analysis of the proposed regulations with reference to colleges and universities, see 
NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, DEVOS’ PROPOSED CHANGES TO TITLE IX EXPLAINED (Feb. 7, 
2018), https://nwlc.org/resources/devos-proposed-changes-to-title-ix-explained/ [https://perma.cc/6 
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5.  Analysis of proposed regulations: back to the courts 
The most problematic changes proposed in the new regulations for 
pre-college institutions deal with definitions and legal standards that 
the OCR would apply to complaints filed with the Department of Edu-
cation. Section 106.44 of the proposed regulations requires that the re-
cipient of federal funds have actual knowledge of sexual harassment and 
respond in a manner that is deliberately indifferent in order for a viola-
tion to occur.283 Section 106.44(a) defines “deliberately indifferent” as a 
response that is “clearly unreasonable.”284 Section 106.30 defines “sex-
ual harassment” as “unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a 
person equal access to the [recipient’s] education program or activ-
ity.”285 Actual knowledge includes knowledge of the Title IX Coordina-
tor or of “an official of the recipient who has ‘the authority to institute 
corrective measures on behalf of the recipient’” or in elementary and 
secondary schools, a teacher in the context of peer harassment.286 
These proposed standards would largely adopt for the OCR the 
most stringent interpretations of the Supreme Court’s rigid standards 
for monetary damages in Title IX cases.287 These new OCR standards 
would require actual knowledge that the conduct described in the com-
plaint already be sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive to deny equal access to educational opportunities in order to trigger 
a school district’s response to the behavior. And, once triggered, if that 
response is not “clearly unreasonable,” the school district would be con-
sidered compliant. 
As demonstrated above in Part III.A.1, the Supreme Court’s rigid 
standards in private parties’ damages actions relieve school authorities 
(even in some of the most egregious cases) of investigating and respond-
ing to ongoing sex- and gender-based harassment. Moreover, a number 
of lower courts have interpreted the “deliberately indifferent” standard 
very strictly, permitting a school to exonerate itself by responding only 
once to the harassment, even if the response is not effective.288 These 
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standards as applied by the courts differ drastically from the more rea-
sonable standards used traditionally by OCR of both Democratic and 
Republican Departments of Education. As explained in Part III.B.1–2 
above, the OCR has traditionally used a standard that requires a school 
to respond when it believes or has reason to believe that the harassment 
is occurring, and once the response takes place, to monitor it for effec-
tiveness. If the response is not effective, schools must attempt different 
remedies until they have eliminated the problem.289 Consider again the 
Pahssen case. If this case were investigated by the OCR using the 2001 
guidance, there is no question that the OCR would have found the 
school district was noncompliant when it failed to respond initially to 
three incidents of sexual harassment by a student who had a history of 
sexual assault and harassment and when it stopped monitoring John 
Doe’s behavior after thirty days of surveillance. In contrast, under the 
proposed rules, the OCR’s ability to find noncompliance by the school 
would likely be hampered, which would prevent the OCR from entering 
into a resolution with the school district requiring it to adopt new train-
ing, reporting, and investigatory methods. The same would be true if 
the Stiles case, discussed in Part III.A. above, had been investigated by 
the OCR. Using the 2001 standards, the OCR would certainly have 
found that the school district was not in compliance with Title IX be-
cause the alleged victim in the case, a middle-school boy, was repeatedly 
harassed verbally and physically over a two-year period and his mother 
frequently reported the egregious harassment to school authorities. Alt-
hough the court concluded that the school did not act with deliberate 
indifference because it had taken some steps to punish the harassers, 
the OCR would have likely concluded that because school authorities 
knew about the harassment, it had a responsibility to investigate and 
engage in a prompt remedial response. If the initial remedy was not 
effective, the OCR would have held the school to its ongoing obligation 
to assure that the victim would not continue to experience harassment 
from the harasser(s). If the proposed OCR amendments becomes law, 
however, it is very likely that the OCR would follow the courts’ stand-
ards and conclude that the school was not deliberately indifferent be-
cause it took some minimal steps to punish the harassers. 
Besides differing standards, the nature of the courts and the OCR 
has influenced how Title IX has traditionally been enforced. Histori-
cally, the OCR process has permitted a back-and-forth between the 
OCR and the school district that is under investigation.290 There are no 
monetary damages, unlike in federal court, and the OCR investigators 
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can survey the policies and procedures in place and their implementa-
tion. This traditional structure permits the OCR and the recipients to 
enter into Resolution Agreements that detail how the schools are ex-
pected to improve and, by doing so, avoid a loss of funding for the 
schools. This structure encourages better future enforcement of Title 
IX. 
If the proposed regulations become law, the OCR will likely decline 
to investigate many valid complaints and will abdicate its role of edu-
cating the educators about Title IX law. In essence, the administrative 
oversight contemplated by the statute will be upended, and the preven-
tive and educative roles of the OCR will be eliminated. It is highly un-
likely that the drafters of the progressive legislation of Title IX, given 
an understanding of changing cultural mores surrounding sex- and gen-
der-based harassment, would agree to interpret legislation to have such 
a limited effect as that contemplated by the proposed regulations. 
Moreover, as the notice of the proposed regulations acknowledges, 
the Davis case does not apply to the Department of Education OCR 
standards, and the OCR is free to follow its own standards in applying 
Title VII. The Davis standards, the Court makes clear, are applied be-
cause the Court implied a private right of action in Davis for monetary 
damages.291 The Court, in essence, was conscious of its responsibility 
not to overstep Congressional authorization. As noted above, the stat-
ute authorizes the Department of Education explicitly to deal with Title 
IX violations but does not explicitly create a cause of action in the 
courts. It is clear that the Court concludes that the OCR may apply its 
own standards, and the OCR has always done so. But the irony is this: 
despite the possible justification for the strict standards that may exist 
in lawsuits for damages against the school districts, no such justifica-
tion exists in an OCR investigation. The original statute292 sets out the 
Department of Education as the enforcer of the statute, and the OCR 
does not impose monetary damages. In the case of a recalcitrant school 
district that refuses to comply or resolve a complaint with the OCR, the 
OCR has the additional and scarcely-used remedy of denying federal 
funding to the school district in the future, but this remedy is not ap-
plied without notice to the school district and an opportunity to engage 
in negotiation and to resolve their differences with the OCR through a 
Resolution Agreement.293 
The drafters of the proposed regulations defend their choice to 
adopt the Supreme Court standards by arguing that uniformity will 
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make compliance easier and that schools should have flexibility to de-
termine how to further their disciplinary processes. Furthermore, they 
argue that the misconduct Title IX forbids is that of the educational 
institution, not the underlying sex- or gender-based conduct. First, it 
seems that the flexibility arguments may be more directed at colleges 
and universities than at elementary and secondary schools because in-
stitutions of higher education have more developed grievance proce-
dures for all types of wrongdoing than do pre-college institutions. Sec-
ondly, while uniformity is one potential goal, my discussion above of the 
poor results in cases following the Supreme Court standards suggests 
strongly that if uniformity is such an important goal, the Supreme 
Court should adopt the OCR standards, and not vice versa. 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that use of a negligence stand-
ard—the standard applied in Title VII cases of peer harassment—is too 
harsh on elementary and secondary schools that have control over our 
children and all of the responsibilities to protect them that accompany 
that control. The data show that children are suffering in schools from 
sex- and gender-based harassment of not only their peers, but also from 
the “loading-on” that teachers and coaches engage in after a child re-
ports harassment. While the Supreme Court standards do not always 
rectify these situations, traditional OCR standards have worked to 
eliminate this behavior.  
IV. HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE TO PREVENT SCHOOLS’ ROLE AS 
TRAINING GROUNDS 
Parts I–III raise questions about what the law can do to resolve the 
many problems I have identified in this article. We must recognize that 
no matter what the condition of the law is, it is not sufficient to correct 
all or even most of these problems. Despite the good work of the OCR 
in previous administrations and Title VII law that forbids sex- and gen-
der-based harassment in workplaces, illegal discriminatory harass-
ment is still pervasive in schools and workplaces. Much of this harass-
ment will not disappear until there is social change, and changes in 
society do not normally progress constantly on an upward trajectory. 
Change moves forward; then, there is backlash, and change moves for-
ward again. But the law can play some role in effecting change: it can 
create incentives and disincentives, and it can tailor remedies to im-
prove behaviors (and perhaps, attitudes) in schools and workplaces. If 
the law does not move forward to effect positive change, it will become 
a protector of those who harass and those who tolerate the harassment. 
Masculinities theory sees gender as a structure that is constructed 
upon and actively constructs inequalities. It is not men or women who 
are the problem. It is the structure that dictates how men, women, boys, 
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and girls should act and the roles they should play. Until very recently 
in the U.S., gender has been considered a binary structure that denies 
the possibility of anything other than man (masculine) and woman 
(feminine). While there seems to be a marked change in attitudes 
among young Americans about the inevitability of binary gender iden-
tities, there is also a group of young folks that resists such change. Mas-
culinities theory posits that it is the gendered constructions—such as 
masculinity, especially those forms of masculinity that are forced and 
exaggerated—that create incentives to harass others. Often, however, 
because gendered behaviors are considered the norm—in fact, are con-
sidered by many to be dictated by biological sex—gender is invisible to 
many of us. So, in schools, even adults such as administrators, teachers, 
and coaches reinforce gender norms that, in turn, motivate students to 
harass others. Without an understanding of this dynamic, schools and 
teachers will not be able to teach children not to harass, or even to rec-
ognize all of the illegal harassment that takes place. 
Moreover, multidimensional masculinities theory encourages us all 
to consider not only gender, but also all of the other co-existing identi-
ties of the parties in context of the situation.294 So, besides sex, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity of the different participants when har-
assment takes place, we should consider the race, class, national origin, 
and other identities as well as whether the alleged victims and perpe-
trators are persons with disabilities. A significant percentage of chil-
dren who have disabilities are victims of sex-or gender-based harass-
ment, and a significant number of OCR Title IX complaints also allege 
intersectional claims, including racial, national origin, and disability-
based harassment. In formulating solutions, all of these facts must be 
taken into account. Furthermore, research demonstrates that racial in-
equalities exist in schools, especially in the ways that discipline is 
meted out.295 In formulating a solution, it is important that school au-
thorities understand the implicit biases that cause these differential 
disciplinary measures and that they take actions to counteract them. 
To complicate matters, schools are often large, overcrowded, and 
lacking in resources, and their teachers are underpaid. It may create a 
huge burden to ask schools to serve as the focal points to change gender 
norms in society. By the same token, we cannot sacrifice our children 
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by allowing schools to ignore their responsibility to control the harass-
ing behaviors taking place under their noses. Reforms need to include 
funding for education of teachers and children about the evils of sex- 
and gender-based harassment and its causes. 
A.  Necessary Law Reform 
First, it is clear that the regulations proposed by the Department 
of Education should not become law. As the analysis of the court cases 
in Part III.A. above demonstrates, the standards employed by the 
courts permit school districts to escape monetary damages for their fail-
ure to control serious harassment in their midst. These standards 
should not replace the standards successfully used by the OCR for more 
than eighteen years to resolve complaints and assure ongoing compli-
ance. 
Second, when Congress has the political will, it should pass amend-
ments to Title IX to assure better compliance. Those amendments 
should include an express authorization of private lawsuits for damages 
against school districts that would overrule Davis. Amendments to Title 
IX should set negligence standards for both the court cases and the com-
plaints investigated and resolved by the OCR, thereby overturning the 
proposed regulations should they become law. 
Third, even in the absence of political power to make these changes, 
the lower courts can interpret Gebser and Davis in a way that avoids 
the harsh results and at the same time faithfully follows the Supreme 
Court’s standards. First, in the context of peer harassment in elemen-
tary and secondary schools, a teacher, counselor, or other professional 
who observes or hears about behavior that is either already severe or 
appears to be escalating should have the responsibility to report and/or 
correct the behavior. The professional’s knowledge should be sufficient 
to constitute actual knowledge by school authorities and should trigger 
a responsibility to investigate and take remedial measures. Where chil-
dren are very young or the victim has an intellectual disability, the pro-
fessional’s responsibilities to investigate should be triggered sooner if a 
victim attempts to communicate with the professional but the victim is 
not capable of communicating the details of the harassment. Second, 
once there is actual knowledge, the professional, along with other school 
authorities, must investigate the situation and promptly remedy it. A 
finding of deliberate indifference can occur if school authorities’ remedy 
is not effective, and the authorities do nothing more to correct the situ-
ation. As some courts conclude now, knowledge that the perpetrator has 
a history of harassment of either the alleged victim or another victim 
should constitute actual knowledge for the purposes of triggering a duty 
to take a more cautious approach to the perpetrator, such as more adult 
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supervision. Finally, lower courts should be more cautious in granting 
dispositive motions in these cases. Many motions for summary judg-
ment, for example, are granted where there are genuine issues of ma-
terial facts for the juries to decide. These material facts include who had 
knowledge, and when, the severity of the behaviors, and whether the 
victim suffered a denial of access to educational programs as a result, 
and whether the school’s response was deliberately indifferent. The dif-
ference between “unreasonable” (which is legal) and “clearly unreason-
able” (which is not) is something that a jury of the parties’ peers should 
ordinarily decide based on the facts found at trial. 
Fourth, if the proposed regulations become law, OCR investigators 
should interpret the regulations in a way that comports with the law 
but simultaneously holds schools responsible for ignoring damaging 
harassment in the schools. Because of the different posture of the OCR 
investigations from court cases, the OCR has the ability to continue to 
use its investigations as a means of educating recipients concerning 
how to assure compliance and avoid problems in the future. Continued 
use of voluntary resolution agreements should help. Even if the OCR 
finds that there is insufficient evidence of noncompliance in the partic-
ular case, the OCR should use its investigation to encourage procedural 
compliance if the recipient, for example, has not appointed a Title IX 
Coordinator,296 has not notified all students and teachers of its policies 
and practices, etc. If this type of noncompliance exists, OCR investiga-
tors should encourage schools to sign agreements to resolve those is-
sues. The OCR should encourage educational institutions to offer edu-
cational and training programs for students and teachers that deal with 
issues of harassment, and its causes, and how to respond. This training, 
in accordance with the sophistication of the audience, should include 
instruction on concepts of gender and masculinity. 
B.  Schools as Training Grounds for Eliminating Harassment 
Finally, no matter what standards the OCR and the courts use, ed-
ucational institutions should be encouraged to adopt educational pro-
graming for administrators and teachers that explains implicit bias, 
masculinity, gender stereotyping, and other phenomena that can lead 
 
 296 A recent study of California and Colorado schools found that many school districts have 
failed to appoint a Title IX coordinator, contrary to their legal responsibilities. See Elizabeth J. 
Meyer & Andrea Somoza-Norton, Addressing Sex Discrimination with Title IX Coordinators in the 
#MeToo Era, 100 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 8 (Oct. 2018). Even when they have appointed Title IX coor-
dinators, most of the Title IX coordinators are not very knowledgeable about the law and their 
responsibilities, have infrequently or never conducted trainings for the faculty and staff in their 
district, have many other responsibilities that overwhelm those as Title IX coordinator, and are 
often ignorant of their responsibilities especially with reference to transgender students. Id. 
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to toleration of illegal harassment.297 Without understanding that much 
of the behavior described is caused by what many think is normal be-
havior of children, school officials will not be able to curb their own be-
haviors that encourage harassment or fail to recognize it in the school 
children. Merely because the behaviors are common does not make 
them normal in an egalitarian society. Thus, schools need educational 
reform programs directed at all levels: administrators, teachers, 
coaches, and students. Of course, the training of children must be age 
appropriate.298 Only by educating school authorities, teachers, and chil-
dren can we avoid schools as training grounds for harassment and move 
toward schools as training grounds for respect, citizenship, and elimi-
nating harassment. In the age of the #MeToo Movement, our society 
deserves no less. 
 
 297 See, e.g., D.K. Whitford, et. al., Empathy Intervention to Reduce Implicit Bias in Pre-Service 
Teachers, 122 PSYCH. REP. 670 (2019) (demonstrating reduced implicit bias in teachers who were 
given training on empathy); P.G. Devine, et.al., A Gender Bias Habit-Breaking Intervention Led to 
Increased Hiring of Female Faculty in STEM Departments, 73 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH, 211 
(2017) (demonstrating anti-bias training increased hiring of female faculty in STEM); L. A. Rud-
man, et. al, “ Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH, 856 (2001) (demonstrating that prejudice and bias seminar re-
duced stereotypes and bias in college students). 
 298 One concern when engaging in Title IX training and monitoring is what I would call the 
“hyper-responsive” reports of very young children as sexual harassers. A response to sexual har-
assment in the schools needs to be aware that very young children often are not capable of sexual 
harassment and attempting to enforce the “rules” against them can be devastating. See Amy B. 
Cyphert, Objectively Offensive: The Problem of Applying Title IX to Very Young Children, 51 FAM. 
L. QUART. 325 (2017) (discussing cases of very small children accused of sexual harassment). 
